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IS THE LEGAL PROFESSION TOO INDEPENDENT?
LIMOR ZER-GUTMAN* & ELI WALD**
Faced with mounting pressure to permit national law practice and increase
access to legal services for those who cannot afford to pay for them and
critiques about growing inequality and its failure to lead the battles for greater
gender and racial justice, the legal profession’s response has been to resist
reform proposals by invoking its independence. Lawyers and lawyers alone,
asserts the profession, ought to determine the pace and details of nationalizing
law practice, set the conditions under which nonlawyers and artificial
intelligence can offer legal services, and respond to growing inequality among
lawyers and concerns about the role lawyers play, and fail to play, in the quest
for a more just society. Any outside interference, cautions the profession, would
undermine lawyers’ independence and our commitment to the Rule of Law.
Asserting the independence of the bar has proven to be an effective rhetorical
ploy, successfully disarming criticisms and weakening calls for reform—
because who can argue against the Rule of Law?
This Article argues that in debating the complex challenges of access,
equality, and justice, the American legal profession’s claims of independence
must be carefully scrutinized rather than deferred to, and that, if the profession
cannot meet the burden of showing that particular reform proposals undercut
its independence, its claims must be dismissed. In support of its thesis, the
Article advances theoretical and comparative claims. Theoretically, it draws
on distinctions between types of legal professions—mature and emerging—and
between types of independence claims—from the state and from powerful
clients—to establish that claims by mature legal professions, such as the
American legal profession, of independence from the state deserve little
deference. If the profession cannot or will not address the access, equality, and
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Michelle Penn, faculty services liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, for her outstanding research assistance. We thank Richard Abel, Eyal Katvan, Michal Ofer
Tsfoni, and Neta Ziv for their helpful comments.
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justice challenges facing it, state and federal legislatures ought to take
appropriate regulatory action unencumbered by the independence claims of the
bar.
Comparatively, the Article shows that a mature legal profession can be too
independent in the sense that it takes advantage of its independence from the
state not only to defeat reform proposals but also to advance its self-interest at
the expense of the public interest. Offering a detailed study of the Israeli legal
profession, the Article documents how—in response to the opening of new law
schools and a significant increase in the number of lawyers, and to increased
competition in the market for legal services from nonlawyers and artificial
intelligence—the Israeli Bar Association, which exercises exclusive control
over the practice of law in Israel, took advantage of its independence from the
state to reduce the number of new lawyers and stifle competition. Among other
measures, the Israeli Bar Association made the bar exam harder to pass,
extended the mandatory internship period, and aggressively asserted
unauthorized practice of law rules against nonlawyers and artificial
intelligence companies.
The experience of the Israeli legal profession, an independent from the state
mature legal profession, should serve as a cautionary tale for its American
counterpart. Left unchecked, a profession can be too independent and advance
its self-interest at the expense of the public interest. To address access,
equality, and justice challenges, the American legal profession must engage in
reform proposals in good faith and avoid hiding behind empty assertions of
threats to its independence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal profession is at a crossroads, facing four interlocking challenges.
First, the practice of law is growing nationally, increasingly putting it at odds
with the historically state-based admission, licensing, regulatory, and
disciplinary processes. Second, the profession is facing unprecedented
pressures to increase access to those who cannot afford to pay for it by allowing
nonlawyers to offer legal services at a reduced cost. Third, the profession is
struggling with increased stratification, economic inequality, and instability.
Finally, lawyers are under scrutiny for failing to lead the way as our nation is
experiencing a racial and gender justice reckoning. And these challenges are
taking place as the profession is coming to terms with the COVID-19 pandemic
and its disruptive impact on the practice of law.1
As lawyers navigate these challenges, one presumption is hardly ever
revisited: the independence of the legal profession. Indeed, to question the
independence of the bar is heresy because, as the profession keeps reminding
us, an independent bar is a condition-precedent for the Rule of Law, justice, and
the protection of our rights and freedoms.2 Notably, however, the presumption
of independence is, no pun intended, anything but an academic affair.
Preserving the independence of the bar means that the nationalization of the
practice of law will be overseen by lawyers who will retain near-exclusive
control over admission, licensing, regulation, and disciplinary affairs. It also
means that lawyers will have a meaningful say, if not outright control, over the
practice of law by nonlawyers and artificial intelligence (AI). Fidelity to an
independent bar implies that lawyers alone ought to deal with—or leave
unaddressed—the growing inequality within the profession, and that lawyers
alone ought to decide how to respond to calls for greater racial and gender
justice by Black Lives Matter and @metoo advocates. Practically speaking, the
independence of the bar shapes and informs the future of the profession at this
crucial moment for lawyers.3

1. Infra Part II.A.
2. Infra Part II.B.
3. Infra Part II.C.
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But what if the independence of the bar is an excuse used by the profession
to block much needed public interest reform and shape the future in its own
self-interest? This Article argues that instead of accepting the independence of
the profession as an irrebuttable presumption, we need to carefully examine
independence claims in context and assess how they matter to particular reform
claims. The thesis of the Article is that in autocratic societies with emerging
legal professions, the independence of the bar and the judiciary are constitutive
elements of the Rule of Law, justice, and fairness; whereas in liberal
democracies, with mature legal professions, the independence of the bar is often
invoked by lawyers as a (powerful) rhetorical ploy to defeat reform proposals
that are inconsistent with the profession’s self-interest. This, to be sure, does
not mean that independence claims by mature legal professions must always be
dismissed out of hand as lawyer posturing, but it does mean that such claims
must be subjected to a healthy degree of scrutiny as we navigate important
challenges that will determine the future of the practice of law, access to legal
services, and greater equality within and outside of the profession.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I begins with a study of the
challenges facing the legal profession in the twenty-first century. It then
summarizes the independence claims of the bar and shows how mature legal
professions may use these claims to defeat public interest reform agendas acting
in lawyers’ self-interest. Part II draws on the experience of another mature bar,
the Israeli legal profession, to demonstrate how a too independent profession
uses its power to act in its members’ self-interest. The Article’s analysis
establishes that, rhetorical pretenses about the demise of the Rule of Law aside,
a mature legal profession can be too independent in the sense that it uses its
powers to advance its own interests at the expense of the public good. The
claim that a monopolistic legal profession may use its unchecked power to
advance its own self-interest at the expense of the public is not new.4 The main
contribution of this Article is to offer a contemporary, detailed account of how
exactly a mature legal profession uses its independence to advance its selfinterest and defeat public spirited reform proposals. The Article concludes with
a cautionary independence tale, exploring the ways independence claims should
and should not inform our discourse as we traverse the future of the legal
profession and the thorny challenges facing it.

4. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, 37–38 (1989); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE
RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 2–3 (1977); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 186–87, 305–06 (1999).
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II. THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CHALLENGES,
INDEPENDENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW PRACTICE
As the legal profession begins to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic, it
faces complex interconnected challenges. These challenges are made more
complicated than they need to be when lawyers over-claim independence to
undercut reform proposals meant to address evolving practice realities,
increased access to legal services, and concerns about growing inequality
within the profession.
A. The Challenges Facing the Legal Profession
The nationalization, even globalization, of the practice of law has long been
a concern for BigLaw, serving large entity clients with national and global legal
needs.5 State-based admission and licensing schemes restrict competitive
entry-level and lateral hiring and state-based unauthorized practice of law rules
(UPL) limit effective national service of clients or add costs for local counsel.6
At the same time, state-based disciplinary enforcement undermines the
effective regulation of lawyers and law firms who de facto practice on a national
basis.7 Yet, in the twenty-first century, the nationalization of law practice is no
longer just a BigLaw problem. Although some practice areas and fields of law
remain predominantly state-based—for example, plaintiff attorneys’ work
related to automobile accidents and defense counsel’s representation of those
accused of violating states’ penal codes—increasingly clients’ legal needs cut
across state borders.8

5. MITT REGAN & LISA H. ROHRER, BIGLAW: MONEY AND MEANING IN THE MODERN LAW
FIRM 3 (Chicago University Press 2021).
6. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021), for example, generally
allows a lawyer to provide legal services on a temporary basis in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
not licensed that are “undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter.” Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics,
Nationalizing Law Practice and the Future of the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 489, 511–12 (2011); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV.
335, 346 (1994).
7. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 648
(1981) (“[S]tudy after study has shown that the current rules of professional conduct are not
enforced.”); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 493 (1990) (noting
rules of professional conduct tend to be “systematically underenforced”); David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 814–19 (1992); RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN
THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008) (studying disciplined
lawyers in New York and showing that underenforcement is a serious concern).
8. Wald, supra note 6, at 494.
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Consider a small business owner. In the ordinary course of doing business,
national supply chains require interstate contracting and give rise to interstate
disputes. Obtaining lines of credit, from both commercial lenders and the Small
Business Administration, demands lawyers with cross-state legal expertise.
The ability of state-licensed lawyers to effectively and efficiently serve the
national needs of their clients is strained under the state-based rules of
professional conduct, which limit the services lawyers can offer out-of-state.9
Similarly, the ability of lawyers to effectively compete in the market for legal
services to the benefit of clients is constrained under the traditional state-based
regime, which forces lawyers to initially choose one jurisdiction in which to
practice law out of law school and imposes state-based admission hurdles, fees,
and Continuing Legal Education (CLE) requirements on those wishing to
practice on a more national basis. The COVID-19 pandemic drove home some
of the anachronistic features of the state-based regulatory apparatus,
complicating the lives of lawyers admitted and licensed in State A but forced
to reside and practice out of State B for an extended period of time.10
Next, insufficient access to legal services has plagued middle class and poor
Americans for a while.11 Recently, frustration with the legal profession and
politicians’ apparent inability to close the access gap—taking place at the same
time as AI advances increase possibilities of nonlawyer delivery of legal
services—has led to various experiments with access-driven initiatives and
limited deregulation of the practice of law. Arizona and Utah, for example,
have launched programs allowing nonlawyers to offer limited legal services.12
9. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
10. Anne G. Crisp, Joan MacLeod Heminway & Gray Buchanan Martin, Business Law and
Lawyering in the Wake of COVID-19, 22 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 365, 374–75 (2021).
11. See Roger C. Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor, 26 VILL. L. REV. 521, 555
(1981); Kenney Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 806–07 (1971);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 7, 143–83 (2003); JEANNE CHARN & RICHARD
ZORZA, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ALL AMERICANS 1 (Bellow-Sacks Access to Civil Legal
Services Project, President and Fellows of Harvard College 2005).
12. See UTAH JUDICIAL ADMIN. r. 14-802(c) (2017) (permitting licensed paralegal practitioners
to engage in limited practice in areas including divorce and cohabitant abuse). Arizona has also begun
a two-year pilot project that will license a small number of nonlawyer “legal advocates” to provide
limited advice on civil matters arising from domestic violence. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Training
for Nonlawyers to Provide Legal Advice Will Start in Arizona in the Fall, ABA J. (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/training-for-nonlawyers-to-provide-legal-advice-starts-inarizona [https://perma.cc/LL9J-FAZS]. As of November 2021, the State Bar of California was
considering a proposal that would permit nonlawyer paraprofessionals to provide legal advice and
undertake other tasks typically handled by attorneys in areas such as family law, housing, consumer
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AI breakthroughs challenge old restrictions on nonlawyer providers, eclipsing
the services already offered by the likes of LegalZoom.13 Similar deregulatory
developments in Canada, the U.K., and around the world suggest that the days
of the legal profession’s monopoly over the provision of legal services are
coming to an end,14 and that the profession must come to terms with solutions
meant to increase access to those who cannot afford to pay lawyers’ fees.15
To make matters worse, the nationalization and globalization of law
practice and the access-driven deregulation of lawyers’ monopoly are taking
place in a time of unprecedented instability, growing stratification, and
increased economic inequality for lawyers. Discrimination, exclusion, and
stratification are not new phenomena for the legal profession.16 Explicit gender
debt, employment/income maintenance, and collateral criminal law. Paraprofessionals would also be
able to have minority ownership interests in law firms. See CALIFORNIA PARAPROFESSIONAL
PROGRAM WORKING GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/publicComment/2021/CPPWG-Report-to-BOT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJ4Z-JRZ5]. Notably, Washington was the first state in the country to experiment
with a nonlawyer affordable legal support option to help meet the needs of those unable to afford the
services of an attorney. It authorized Legal Technicians, also known as Limited License Legal
Technicians (LLLT), to advise and assist people going through divorce, child custody, and other
family-law matters in Washington. On June 4, 2020, the Washington Supreme Court decided to sunset
the LLLT program, citing the program’s high costs and its inability to attract LLLTs. See Become a
Legal Technician, WASH. BAR ASS’N., (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.wsba.org/for-legalprofessionals/join-the-legal-profession-in-wa/become-a-legal-technician
[https://perma.cc/7RDY7LA4].
13. John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence
Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041,
3041–42 (2014); Dana Remus & Frank S. Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and
the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 502–03 (2017); Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot
Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 329 (2019). See generally MICHAEL LEGG & FELICITY BELL,
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2020).
14. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
10 (2012); Andrea Remynse, Preventing Self-Regulation from Becoming Self-Strangulation: The
Application of Deregulation and Independent Oversight to Allow the US Legal System to Adapt to
Market Forces Currently Threatening Lawyers, Law Schools and Access to Justice, 22 MICH. ST.
INT’L. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2014) (summarizing deregulation of the legal profession in the United
Kingdom).
15. In 2016 the ABA passed Resolution 105, seemingly opening the door for the provision of
legal services by nonlawyers. See ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES, REP. TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOL. 105 (2016), [https://perma.cc/A7NQ-SKKS]. See generally RICHARD
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2010).
16. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 120
(1966); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 40 (1976); ERWIN SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET
LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 44–46 (1964); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM
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and racial discrimination and exclusion from the practice of law were the norm
until the 1950s, gradually declining through the 1960s and 1970s.17 Economic
and ethnoreligious stratification was similarly common through the 1970s,18
and the growth of large law firms contributed to the fragmentation of the bar
into the corporate and the individual hemispheres.19 Moreover, down cycles
have occurred before,20 leading some commentators to comment that the legal
profession was in a state of perpetual decline.21
The twenty-first century, however, has added new types of discrimination,
stratification, and instability challenges. Implicit bias has proven hard for law
firms to combat.22 For some BigLaw equity partners and elite in-house lawyers,
these are the best of times,23 while other attorneys are relegated to new lawyer-

PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR
ASSOCIATION 141–44 (1988) (discussing the development of bar rules designed to exclude
ethnoreligious minorities and non-elites).
17. Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms,
24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1042 (2011); Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination and
Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1079, 1119 (2011).
18. Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1803,
1804 (2008); Eli Wald, Jewish Lawyers and the U.S. Legal Profession: The End of the Affair?, 36
TOURO L. REV. 299, 309 (2020).
19. On the individual and corporate hemispheres of the legal profession, see JOHN P. HEINZ &
EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319–20 (1982)
(finding that the legal profession consists of two categories of lawyers whose practice settings,
socioeconomic and ethno-religious backgrounds, education, and clientele differ considerably); JOHN
P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, URBAN LAWYERS:
THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 30–31, 44 (2005) (documenting that lawyers work in two
fairly distinct hemispheres—individual and corporate—and that mobility between these hemispheres
is relatively limited).
20. See generally William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor
and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998); Robert W.
Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185,
1209–10 (2003).
21. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 283
(1998) (“Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline. Or so it appears from the chronic
laments by critics within and outside the bar.”).
22. Russell G. Pearce, Eli Wald & Swethaa S. Ballakrishnen, Difference Blindness vs. Bias
Awareness: Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships,
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2407, 2413 (2015).
23. Eli Wald, Getting in and out of the House: The Worlds of In-House Counsel, Big Law, and
Emerging Career Trajectories of In-House Lawyers, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1765, 1776 (2020).
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employee classes.24 Increased competition, uncertainty, and instability
continue to plague law firms,25 and all of this was happening pre-pandemic.26
Finally, notwithstanding lofty rhetoric characterizing lawyers as public
citizens who owe a special responsibility to the quality of justice,27 the legal
profession has long had a disappointing record of under-representation of
women, lawyers of color, and lawyers from other disadvantaged groups in
positions of power and influence.28 Against this poor background, the legal
profession has struggled to meet the challenges of increased racial and gender
equality by failing to join and lead movements such as Black Lives Matter and
@metoo.29
24. Eli Wald, In-House Pay: Are Salaries, Stock Options, and Health Benefits a “Fee” Subject
to a Reasonableness Requirement and Why the Answer Constitutes the Opening Shot in a Class War
between Lawyer-Employees and Lawyer-Professionals, 20 NEV. L.J. 243, 282–89 (2019).
25. See generally John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse, 75 BUS. LAW. 1399 (2019).
26. Raymond H. Brescia, Lessons from the Present: Three Crises and Their Potential Impact on
the Legal Profession, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 607, 608–09 (2021).
27. “A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of
the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, pmbl., cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (emphasis added).
28. Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 57–59, 64–69
(1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 587–94 (1996); Deborah
L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J.
1731, 1764–68 (1991); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Robert Sauté, Bonnie Oglensky & Martha Gever, Glass
Ceilings and Open Doors: Women’s Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291,
309 (1995); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking,
Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV.
1581, 1677 (1998); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 502 (1996); Eli Wald, Serfdom
without Overlords: Lawyers and the Fight against Class Inequality, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 269,
278 (2016).
29. Deborah L. Rhode, David Boies’s Egregious Involvement With Harvey Weinstein, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/opinion/david-boies-harveyweinstein.html [https://perma.cc/4SWA-HPUH]. To demonstrate its commitment to justice and
equality, the profession sometimes points to the celebrated record of civil rights attorneys, or, more
recently, to the willingness of some of its leading lawyers to represent Guantánamo Bay detainees, see
generally, e.g., THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW (Mark P.
Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., NYU Press 2011), or to the flocking of immigration lawyers to U.S.
airports to help represent those in need following President Trump’s executive orders, see, e.g., Enid
Trucios-Haynes & Marianna Michael, Mobilizing a Community: The Effect of President Trump’s
Executive Orders on the Country’s Interior, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577, 590–93 (2018). Yet,
notwithstanding such inspiring moments, the profession is generally known for advocating for the
powerful and rich, not for its cutting edge commitment to justice movements. KATHARINA PISTOR,
THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 205 (Princeton Univ.
Press 2020).
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B. The Independence of the Legal Profession
An independent legal profession is a cornerstone of the Rule of Law.30 The
independence of the bar from political retaliation and influences means that
people are free to live their lives subject only to the law and may retain lawyers
to explain and advise regarding the law. Lawyers in turn are free to assist
people without fear of persecution or retribution, resulting in clients pursuing a
“first-class citizenship.”31 The independence of the bar manifests itself in selfregulation.32
The legal profession oversees admission and licensing,
promulgates its own rules of professional conduct, and enforces them through
a disciplinary apparatus, maintaining its independence—all in pursuit of the
public interest and effective representation of clients.33
In the United States, the legal profession has long enjoyed ample
independence from political retaliation by the executive and legislative
branches.34 Generally speaking, although with some jurisdiction-based
variations, lawyers are admitted to practice law in each state after earning a law
degree at an accredited law school approved by the American Bar Association
(ABA)—the largest national voluntary bar association—passing a bar exam,
and submitting an application to the state’s supreme court. Upon admission to
the bar, lawyers are subject to the state’s rules of professional conduct, adopted
by each state’s supreme court following the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, and, in particular, are subject to discipline imposed by the state
30. Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807, 867–71 (2017). See
generally TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND
PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 370–71 (1987) (discussing ways in which legal professions take
primary responsibility for sustaining and advocating the integrity of the legal process and the Rule of
Law throughout the world).
31. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986).
32. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, pmbl., cmts. 10–12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (“The legal
profession is largely self-governing . . . . To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps
maintain the legal profession’s independence from government domination. An independent legal
profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is
more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the
right to practice. The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of
self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in
the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar.”
(emphasis added).
33. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7, 61 (1988).
34. See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW—THE LAW
MAKERS (1950); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2005).
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supreme court for violating the rules. Finally, to maintain their license in good
standing, lawyers must stay current by, inter alia, meeting CLE requirements
overseen by the state’s supreme court. Thus, although not exclusive—many
jurisdictions have passed numerous statutes regulating the practice of law and
a growing number of federal statutes also apply to lawyers35—state supreme
courts dominate and exercise significant control over the legal profession,
ensuring its independence.36
Indeed, the American legal profession is so independent that in recent
memory, scholarly attention has shifted away from worrying about the
independence of the profession from political pressures by the executive and
legislative branches to worrying about the independence of the bar from market
pressures by powerful entity clients.37 Moreover, commentators have pointed
out that—following crises claims and complaints about lawyers assisting large
entity clients to perpetrate massive frauds on the public—the profession has
asserted its independence to defeat reform agenda meant to address “Where
were the lawyers?” challenges.38 That is, the profession has invoked the
rhetoric of independence, meant to insulate it from political pressures in the
name of pursuing the public interest, to defend against reform proposals meant
to enhance its independence from market pressures.
Whereas other mature legal professions enjoy similar degrees of
independence,39 the picture is quite different in the case of emerging legal
35. Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The Federalization of
Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 124
(2011).
36. Cf. Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 152 (2010)
(exploring whether trial court and appellate judges, as opposed to state supreme courts, should regulate
lawyers).
37. Gordon, supra note 33, at 8. In the twenty-first century, the concern has been particularly
pronounced with regard to in-house lawyers who serve but one entity client. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011 (1997); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism
and Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 449, 449–50 (1988); Sung
Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2016). On the
power shift from outside counsel to in-house lawyers and their entity clients, see Robert Eli Rosen,
The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND.
L.J. 479, 479–80 (1989); David B. Wilkins, Teams of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2070–71 (2010).
38. See generally, Simon, supra note 20.
39. Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal
Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2718 (2012) (on the independence of the UK legal profession);
Christine Parker, Peering over the Ethical Precipice: Incorporation, Listing and the Ethical
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professions where, notwithstanding significant gains, the independence of the
bar is not secure, and lawyers are sometimes persecuted for advocating for
clients and the Rule of Law.40 Thus, in assessing the independence and
independence claims of legal professions, distinguishing between mature and
emerging legal professions is essential. It requires scrutinizing independence
claims in the former while building and defending independence from the state
to ensure the Rule of Law in the latter. Drawing this distinction, however, is
not always a straightforward undertaking because increased lawyer mobility
across the globe has blurred the line between the practice of law in the United
States and Western Europe and in Asia, Latin America, and other parts of the
world.41 Moreover, multinational corporations, global law firms and other
international intermediaries reshape and redefine the meaning of law practice
and the social structure of legal professions.42
Moreover, the multifaceted, gradual globalization of legal professions
requires nuanced contextual attention to different assertions and types of
independence. Mature legal professions’ claims of independence from the state
ought to be questioned and sometimes discounted, while their market
independence from powerful entity clients ought to be fostered;43 whereas the
independence of emerging legal professions from the state must be prioritized,

Responsibilities of Law Firms (Melbourne L. Sch., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 339, 2008),
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1709838/70-Parker_paper11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q32L-734K] (Austl.); ANTOINE VAUCHEZ & PIERRE FRANCE, THE NEOLIBERAL
REPUBLIC: CORPORATE LAWYERS, STATECRAFT, AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE FRANCE 13–
14, 21 (2020) (Fr.).
40. Elizabeth M. Lynch, China’s Rule of Law Mirage: The Regression of the Legal Profession
Since the Adoption of the 2007 Lawyers Law, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 535, 535 (2010) (China);
Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Perestroika or Just Perfunctory? The Scope and Significance of Russia’s New
Legal Ethics Laws, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 25, 26 (2010) (Russ.); David Pimentel, Reframing the
Independence v. Accountability Debate: Judicial Structure in Light of Judges’ Courage and Integrity,
57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2009) (Pak.). See generally LAWYERS IN 21ST-CENTURY SOCIETIES,
VOL. 1: NATIONAL REPORTS (Richard L. Abel, Ole Hammerslev, Hilary Sommerlad & Ulrike Schultz
eds., 2020) [hereinafter LAWYERS IN 21ST-CENTURY SOCIETIES].
41. Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and Globalization,
38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 670–71 (2013); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LATIN AMERICAN STATES (Univ. Chi. Press 2002).
42. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Import and Export of Law and Legal Institutions:
International Strategies in National Palace Wars, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, 241–53 (David
Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
43. Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Lawyers, 1988-2018—The Professional Project,
in LAWYERS IN 21ST-CENTURY SOCIETIES, supra note 40, at 895–97.
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even as global market forces also shape and inform the development of these
nascent legal professions.44
C. Too Much Independence? Over-Claiming Independence in the Face of
Possible Reform
The U.S. legal profession’s tendency to sound the independence alarm
every time it faces criticism is a concern as the bar attempts to navigate the
challenges facing it in the twenty-first century.
First, consider the
nationalization of law practice. Although some aspects of the regulatory
apparatus have grown quasi-national—for example, the ABA promulgates
uniform accreditation standards for all American law schools,45 the National
Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) administers a portion of the bar exam
for most jurisdictions,46 many states coordinate and have moved toward a
national bar exam,47 and the ABA promulgates the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which serve as the basis for the rules of professional conduct in most
states48—many unsettled questions remain about the future of the
nationalization of law practice. What court or agency will admit lawyers
nationally?49 Who will promulgate and enforce the rules of professional
conduct?50
In theory, one can imagine that the nationalization of law practice may be
achieved via federalization of the bar, that is, by Congress passing statutes
regulating national admission, practice, and discipline of lawyers, perhaps
constituting a national regulatory agency to oversee lawyers. Yet, given the
longstanding independence of the bar, such regulatory reform is unlikely and
certain to be met with strong opposition from the legal profession, state supreme
44. Hilary Sommerland & Ole Hammerslev, Lawyers in a New Geopolitical Conjuncture—
Continuity and Change, in LAWYERS IN 21ST-CENTURY SOCIETIES, supra note 40, at 5–10, 14–22.
45. 2020–2021 STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards/
[https://perma.cc/K3A8-L4Q3].
46. See Jurisdictions Administering the MBE, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS,
https://www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe / [https://perma.cc/VK45-7WJK].
47. See Jurisdictions Administering the UBE, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS,
https://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ [https://perma.cc/K3Y2-7FYP].
48. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/ [https://perma.cc/PZK8FND4].
49. Wilkins, supra note 7, at 814.
50. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 337.

ZER-GUTMAN & WALD_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

354

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:341

courts, and state bar associations. Instead, the ABA is likely to demand a key
role in the regulation of lawyers, and nationalization is more likely to be
achieved by incrementally building on the status quo—for example, by
allowing lawyers to practice de facto nationally based on a license in good
standing from any jurisdiction, perhaps subject to paying additional state-based
fees and availing oneself of discipline by the state supreme courts of all
jurisdictions in which one practices.51
Second, consider the increased access to legal services reform agenda,
driven by both nonlawyers and AI. As in the case of the nationalization of law
practice, many key questions remain unresolved. For example: What rules
should apply and who should regulate nonlawyers? Once again, the legal
profession has invoked its independence claims to assert influence over the
process. At the same time as the organized bar has regularly challenged
nonlawyers’ provision of legal services as the unauthorized practice of law,52 it
has worked hard to dominate deregulation, from curtailing state supreme
courts’ increased access programs53 to claiming that the ABA should regulate
nonlawyers.54
Finally, in the face of mounting pressure to deal with inequality within the
profession and the role of lawyers in justice movements, the bar has once again
asserted its independence to deflect criticisms and maintain control over reform
agendas. After letting law firms self-regulate by pursuing their own mostly
ineffective diversity programs for years, at least measured in terms of the
underrepresentation of women and lawyers of color as powerful equity
partners,55 the ABA has finally passed its “anti-discrimination” rule of
professional conduct56—not without ample controversy57—only to leave out of
51. See, e.g., NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 7.5(a) (2021).
52. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peronia, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American
Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First
Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 90–96 (2000).
53. WARD, supra note 12.
54. ABA, supra note 15 (ABA Resolution 105 claims a role for the ABA in regulating the
practice of nonlawyers offering legal services).
55. Wald, supra note 17.
56. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
57. Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for State
Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195 (2017); Josh Blackman, Reply:
A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 243 (2017).
See also ABA Comm. On Pro. Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493 1, 13 (July 15, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/abaformal-opinion-493.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR8Q-XGDF].
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the rule perhaps the most significant cause of inequality in the twenty-first
century, implicit bias.58 Similarly, with regard to justice movements such as
Black Lives Matter and @metoo, the profession has by and large stayed out of
the fray, with leading law firms issuing sympathetic statements.59 The most the
profession appears willing to do is adopt new equity, diversity, and
inclusiveness (EDI) CLE requirements.60
Collectively, the important challenges facing the legal profession in the
twenty-first century and the bar’s responses to date, relying heavily on the
presumption of independence to counter reform agenda, raise important
questions: Is the American legal profession too independent and is it using
independence to defeat reform policies in its own self-interest?61 The point, to
be clear, is not to suggest that the legal profession should play no role in
addressing the many challenges facing it, nor should it support sweeping
federal-level or state-based legislative reform undermining the long history of
near-exclusive judicial oversight over lawyers. Rather, it is that near-blind
deference to lawyers relying on the rhetoric of independence may be equally
ill-advised. What is needed is a level-headed assessment of various reform
proposals which takes independence claims seriously, but not too
presumptively.
Fortunately, moving away from blind deference and beginning to
systematically assess independence claims does not require reinventing the
regulatory wheel. Rather, the American legal profession may learn from the
comparable independence experiences of other mature legal professions. Here,
we explore the experience of the Israeli legal profession to gain valuable
insights about the future of the American legal profession.

58. Veronica Root Martinez, Combating Silence in the Profession, 105 VA. L. REV. 805, 840
(2019).
59. Kathryn Rubino, What Biglaw Is Saying About The Unrest Sweeping The Nation, ABOVE
THE
LAW
(June
2,
2020),
https://abovethelaw.com/2020/06/biglaw-george-floyd/
[https://perma.cc/6MMW-QQXE].
60. Colorado, for example, has recently revised its CLE requirements to include EDI CLE. See
Continuing Legal and Judicial Education Requirements, COLO. SUP. CT. OFFICE OF ATTY. REG.
COUNSEL,
https://coloradosupremecourt.com/Current%20Lawyers/CLENewAtty.asp
[https://perma.cc/G96Z-8JNW].
61. POSNER, supra note 4, at 186–87.
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III. TOO MUCH INDEPENDENCE?
THE CASE OF THE ISRAELI LEGAL PROFESSION62
In Israel, for several reasons, the legal profession plays a dominant role and
exerts a strong influence on society as a whole. First, from the mid-1980s, with
the rise of the ideology of individualism and the market economy, a discourse
of rights and heightened legalization became central to Israeli society.63 This
included the decline of formalism and the rise of values,64 the constitutional
revolution and the rise in the status of freedom of occupation,65 and the
weakening of monopolies and centralized bodies.66 The legalization process is
expressed in increasing recourse to litigation to solve personal, economic,
social, and even political conflicts.67 Indeed, it has become difficult to contend
with bureaucracy without the help of lawyers.68 For example, every seventh
person finds themselves involved in a legal proceeding in which they require
representation by a lawyer.69
Second, a dramatic rise in the number of lawyers, which began in the mid1990s and has continued ever since, increases the influence of the legal
profession on Israeli society.70 Indeed, Israel has the highest number of lawyers
per capita in the world—a lawyer for every 140 residents.71 The growth in the
62. Some source materials in Hebrew were translated by the authors and assertions supported by
these sources were verified by the Marquette Law Review members and editors using best efforts.
63. Gad Barzilai, The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel: Liberal Politics, Economic
Liberalism, Silence and Dissent, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF
THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 247, 265–67 (2007); MENAHEM MAUTNER, LAW
AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 110 (2011).
64. MAUTNER, supra note 63, at 90–91.
65. Id. at 44–47; SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTION OF ISRAEL 25–31 (2014).
66. Ido Baum & Davida Lachman Messer, Can the Next Amazon or Facebook Be Controlled
Before It Becomes Too Powerful?, 52 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1, 38 (forthcoming 2022).
67. Neta Ziv, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Production of Lawyers in Israel, 19 INT’L
J. LEGAL PRO. 175, 177 (2012).
68. Id.
69. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, COURT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT 2019, 9 (Aug. 2020),
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/statistics_annual_2019/he/%D7%93%D7%95%D7%97%20%
D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%99%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGJ5-ZS56] (Isr.) (author
translated). In 2019, 853,154 new court files were opened together with another 443,785 court files
left open from previous years—for a total of 1,296,939 court files handled in that year. Israel’s
population is approximately 9 million, which means that about every seventh person was involved in
court litigation in 2019. Id.
70. Limor Zer-Gutman, Effects of the Acceleration in the Number of Lawyers in Israel, 19 INT’L
J. LEGAL PROF. 247, 248–50 (2012).
71. Id. at 250.
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number of lawyers led to the transformation of the profession from
homogeneous to heterogeneous following the addition of new population
groups to its ranks. This has been accompanied by a number of occupational
changes stemming from the dramatic numerical growth, for example, the entry
of minority groups into the profession and a large increase in the number of
lawyers in the periphery.72 Beyond sheer numbers, the public visibility and the
overall influence of lawyers are very high. Lawyers are found in all spheres of
society, law, business, media, and politics.73
Third, the independence of the profession along with its high degree of
autonomy and broad self-regulation, which has not changed for nearly sixty
years, sustains the power and influence of Israeli lawyers.74 The professional
regulation of lawyers and the legal services market in Israel is governed by the
Israel Bar Association Law of 1961 [hereinafter “the law”]. The law
established the Israel Bar Association (IBA) as a statutory body in order to
“unite lawyers in Israel and work for the standards and integrity of the legal
profession.”75 According to the law, membership in the IBA is mandatory—
one cannot practice law in Israel without being a member of this body.76 The
IBA is composed of various institutions staffed through general elections held
every four years.77 Four ballots are cast: for the President of the IBA, the
governing party in the IBA’s national institution, the head of the district in
which lawyers are members, and the governing party in the district committee
where lawyers practice.78 The elections are similar in nature to those held for
the Israeli Parliament-Knesset, featuring candidates from numerous parties.79
72. Id. at 250–54; Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Issi Rosen-Zvi & Neta Ziv, Hierarchy and Stratification
in the Israeli Legal Profession, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 436, 444 (2018); Eyal Katvan, Overcrowding
the Profession, 19 INT’L J. LEGAL PRO. 409, 412 (2012). There are no accurate numbers evidencing
the increased diversity of the Israeli legal profession since the Israel Bar Association database does not
specify lawyers’ ethnicity, but the above three different studies all documented this change based on
various surveys conducted among law students and practicing lawyers.
73. Barzilai, supra note 63, at 261.
74. Limor Zer-Gutman, Israel: Regulation of Lawyers and Legal Services in Israel, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS AND LEGAL SERVICES 139, 140
(Andrew Boon ed., 2017).
75. §§ 1–2, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.) (specifying the mandatory
functions of the IBA) (emphasis added).
76. Id. §§ 42, 46.
77. Id. §§ 8(a), 14(a).
78. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 147–48.
79. § 4, Basic Law: the Knesset, SH 244 (1958) (Isr.), https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/1950-1959/pages/basic%20law-%20the%20knesset%20-1958-%20%20updated%20translatio.aspx [https://perma.cc/6789-48B8].
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The candidates campaign as party members, and after the election, negotiations
are held to form a coalition.80
The law constituted the IBA as the sole governing body of the legal
profession. Through its various committees and bodies, the IBA collects
mandatory membership fees, oversees the internship requirement—which is a
condition-precedent for taking the bar exam—administers the bar exam, and
regulates licensing.81 The IBA is also authorized to promulgate disciplinary
rules with the authorization of the Ministry of Justice.82 Based on the law, the
disciplinary system is autonomous and independent, with minimal external
oversight.83 The IBA’s ethics committees issue ethical pre-ruling opinions to
its members, prosecute lawyers for disciplinary misconduct, and operate
regional (first tier) and national (second tier) disciplinary courts.84 Only the
third tier of the disciplinary process is outside of the IBA’s control—there is a
right of appeal of disciplinary courts’ rulings to the Israeli equivalent of a state
district court.85 The IBA is very active in maintaining its exclusive control over
the practice of law in Israel, for example, by enforcing UPL rules against
nonlawyers.86
The influence of the IBA reaches beyond its members to Israeli society as
a whole.87 To begin with, the IBA has two representatives on the nine-member
Judicial Appointments Committee in Israel—the committee which appoints all
judges in Israel, including the Justices of the Supreme Court.88 Next, one of the
permissible functions of the IBA listed in the law is to “give an opinion on bills
concerning the courts and legal procedure.”89 The IBA takes advantage of this
statutory provision by regularly getting involved in the legislative process in

80. Id. §§ 8–9, 13.
81. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 145, 150–53 (describing how the IBA controls both the
internship and the licensing that constitute the entry barriers to the legal profession in Israel).
82. § 109, Israel Bar Association Law (1984) (Isr.).
83. Id. §§ 153–55 (describing how the disciplinary system of lawyers in Israel operates;
establishing its autonomous nature with minimal external oversight).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 155.
86. Ziv, supra note 67, at 179–80.
87. Eyal Katvan, Limor Zer-Gutman & Neta Ziv, Israel: Numbers, Make-Up and Modes of
Practice, in LAWYERS IN 21ST-CENTURY SOCIETIES, supra note 40, at 601.
88. § 6, Courts Law, 2004-1984 (1984) (Isr.).
89. § 3(1), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961 (Isr.).
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the Parliament, not only with regard to legislation relating to the profession.90
Finally, the IBA regularly files amicus briefs in court proceedings that address
the public interest.91
In sum, the Israeli legal profession, through the IBA, enjoys a high degree
of independence, exercising exclusive control over the practice of law in the
county.
A. The Risks of Too Much Independence: Self-Interest and Lack of
Transparency
One danger posed by an exclusive and arguably excessive independence of
the legal profession is that instead of using its ample powers to promote the
public interest, the profession may instead advance the interests of lawyers at
the expense of the public interest and individual rights.92 In Israel, lawyers have
exploited their exclusive power and control over the market for legal services
to systematically advance their own interests, particularly economic ones, even
in instances in which the bar’s self-interest undercuts the public interest and the
rights of nonlawyers, the rights of applicants to the bar, and the rights of other
lawyers. Thus, the profession, vested with responsibility to protect individual
rights, appears to be indifferent to the harm it causes them while pursuing its
own self-interest.

90. See, e.g., Israel Bar Association, Announcement on Insolvency and Economic Rehabilitation
Law (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=392387&catId=3082
[https://perma.cc/JV56-FLAR] (describing the extensive involvement of the IBA, for two years, in the
promulgation of a new bill titled Insolvency and Economic Rehabilitation Law).
91. See,
e.g.,
Israel
Bar
Association
Petition
(Apr.
11,
2021),
https://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=423688&catId=5079 [https://perma.cc/WX5BK2SY] (seeking permission to join a Supreme Court case demanding the appointment of a Minister of
Justice).
See
also
Israel
Bar
Association
Petition
(Feb.
9,
2021),
https://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=421873&catId=5079
[https://perma.cc/7KKEWTAM] (requesting to join a Supreme Court case seeking to compel Israel to provide COVID-19
vaccines to prisoners as done with the general population).
92. For a definition of the “public interest” role of the legal profession see, S. Stephen Mayson,
Legal Services Regulation and ‘The Public Interest’, LEGAL SERVS. INST. (Jan. 2013),
https://stephenmayson.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/mayson-2013-legal-services-regulation-and-thepublic-interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/T22Y-HBMH] (“The public interest concerns objectives and
actions for the collective benefit and good of current and future citizens in achieving and maintaining
those fundamentals of society that are regarded by them as essential to their common security and wellbeing, and to their legitimate participation in society.”).
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i. Self-Interest in Admission: The IBA Revises the Bar Exam and Extends the Length
of the Mandatory Internship to Reduce the Number of New Entrants as the Number of
Lawyers Increases

The law accords the IBA near exclusive control over admission to the
profession. The law sets out three admission criteria. First, a candidate must
hold a law degree from an accredited institution.93 This condition is not within
the control of the IBA because the authority to accredit law schools is granted
to the Council for Higher Education, a public body under the responsibility of
the Ministry of Education. Second, a candidate must complete an internship
that currently stands at eighteen months.94 Third, a candidate must successfully
pass a bar examination.95 The latter two conditions are within the control of the
IBA, which registers candidates, supervises their internship, and examines
them, as well as certifies lawyers by admitting them as members of the
profession.96
The IBA’s control over internships, the bar exam, and admission to the bar
is based on four statutory powers wielded by the IBA: to allow a candidate to
begin an internship,97 to supervise and approve that internship,98 to manage and
evaluate the bar examination,99 and to approve the admission and membership

93. §§ 24–25, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961 (Isr.).
94. Id. at § 35.
95. Id. at § 38.
96. Id. at § 2 (stating the Bar shall: (1) Register interns, supervise their internship and examine
legal interns; (2) Sanction and qualify advocates by admitting them as members of the Bar; (3)
Exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over members and legal interns, as per the provisions of this law; (4)
Provide legal aid to persons of limited means that according to the law are not entitled for state legal
aid, all based on this law.).
97. Id. at §§ 2, 26–27; §§ 2–3, Israel Bar Association Rules (Interns Registration and
Supervision), 5722-1962, KT 1313, (1962) (Isr.).
98. §§ 2, 14, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961 (Isr.); §§ 15(a)-15(c), Israel Bar Association
Rules (Interns Registration and Supervision), 5722-1962, KT 1313, (1962) (Isr.).
99. §§ 38–40, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961 (Isr.).
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of a person who has completed the internship and passed the examination.100
Without such approval a person cannot obtain a license to practice law.101
The first and fourth powers are vested in the hands of the IBA’s internship
committee.102 Unlike the United States, but similar to the U.K. and Canada, a
person who has earned a law degree and wishes to qualify as a lawyer must
submit an application to the IBA to approve beginning an internship. The
application must be supported by an affidavit under oath.103 The affidavit must
detail the candidate’s criminal and disciplinary records as well as police
investigations, attaching all relevant documents.104 The law confers upon the
IBA authority to not register a person as an intern if it believes, based on the
affidavit, that the candidate is not fit to serve as a lawyer.105 The candidate is
given an opportunity to plead their case before a decision is made.106 The openended language of the section—“unfit to be an advocate”107—confers upon the
IBA broad discretion to disqualify an internship candidate.

100. Id. at §§ 44, 46. Section 44 states: “After giving the candidate an opportunity to plead his
case before it, the Bar may refuse to admit him as a member notwithstanding the candidate’s status as
‘qualified.’” The Section continues to detail the two circumstances for such refusal. Section 46 states:
If the Bar decides to admit the candidate or if the Supreme Court voids the Bar’s refusal to admit him,
the Bar shall inscribe him on the Roll of Members of the Bar and shall issue to him a certificate of
membership; the person inscribed may practice the profession of advocacy from the day of his
inscription.” Id.
101. Id. at § 42 (“A person qualified to be an advocate, who is resident in Israel and is an adult,
shall become an advocate upon his admission as a member of the Bar.”).
102. Id. at §§ 27, 44. This committee, which possesses substantive powers, is political by nature
since all its members are volunteer lawyers that are selected by the elected politicians of the bar. Id.
at § 9(e)(1). When the term of the politicians ends, new committee members are selected by newly
elected politicians.
103. § 1(b), Israel Bar Association Rules (Interns Registration and Supervision), 5722-1962, KT
1313, (1962) (Isr.) (“The Bar, as it finds necessary, can require each candidate to provide further
necessary details and documents, and can require the applicant to verify his application in an
affidavit.”).
104. Where a candidate’s affidavit fails to disclose a material fact in the candidate’s past, and
such a fact is later discovered by the IBA, the maker of the affidavit is subject to disciplinary
proceedings and revocation of their membership in the Bar if it is proven that the membership was
obtained by fraud. See § 47, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961 (Isr.).
105. § 27, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961 (Isr.) (“After giving the candidate an
opportunity to plead his case before it, the Bar may refuse to register him as a legal intern
(notwithstanding his eligibility under section 26) if facts, which the Bar believes render him unfit to
be an advocate, have come to light.”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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The internship committee is also authorized to approve the admission of a
candidate who has completed his internship and passed the bar examination (the
fourth statutory power). The committee considers an updated affidavit
submitted by the candidate as well as objections to a candidate put forward by
third-parties.108 Some of the objections come from within the IBA’s ranks, filed
by ethics committees investigating grievances about interns.109 Like the
procedure for approving internships, here too the committee must determine
whether the candidate is “fit to be a lawyer.”110
The IBA internship committee’s decisions regarding candidates, in both the
internship and the admission to the bar stages, are made without guiding rules
and transparency.111 The ad hoc decision-making processes and lack of
transparency make it impossible to predict, assess, and criticize the decisions.
Indeed, only when a decision is contested in court does it become public. An
inspection of these petitions reveals inconsistencies and raises concerns that
unfair decisions could be made by the committee.112 Notably, the IBA has
never published official data relating to the number of requests for internships,
the number of applications for admission which have been rejected each year,
or the grounds for such rejections.113 Furthermore, the IBA has never published
the decisions themselves (redacting the candidate’s name), rendering it
impossible to ascertain whether the decisions are consistent or whether they
have been impacted by improper considerations.
Professor Ofer Tsfoni argues compellingly that the internship committee,
as other bodies of the IBA, is political in nature. Combined with its lack of
transparency, this leads to concerns regarding the ability of the IBA to properly
manage its admission power.114 The research further criticizes the unfair
procedures, the ambiguity in the section of the regulations that refers to the

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at § 43.
Id. at § 27.
Id. at § 44.
Michal Ofer Tsfoni, Regulation Governing Admission to the Bar—Ideals and Reality, 23
HAMISPAT L. REV. 115, 130 (2017) (author translated).
112. Id. at 128–29. The Article studies the discretion not to admit a candidate, even though they
may meet the formal admission requirements. The committee’s discretion is explored in two stages:
who has the authority to exercise the discretion and subject to what procedures; and what are the
content and the scope of the discretion. The Article proposes a reform in Israel and suggests a new
model regarding the decision-making body; the procedures; and the nature of the discretion.
113. Id. at 131.
114. Id. at 130.
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character or past behavior of candidates, and the injustice that is a byproduct of
the procedures.115
A person who has obtained permission to start an internship must do so
under the guidance of a lawyer who has been approved by the IBA as eligible
to supervise interns.116 Although the law specifies formal criteria for being a
supervisor, the IBA has exclusive authority to refuse supervisory accreditation
and to revoke such accreditation after it has been given.117 During the year and
a half long internship period,118 the intern and the supervisor are required to
submit periodic reports to the IBA detailing the tasks performed by the intern.119
The IBA operates a network of inspectors who visit and evaluate the interns.120
The IBA has sole authority to disqualify an internship or to not recognize parts
of it, making it necessary for the intern to repeat the internship.121 Consistent
with its opaque standards of approving internships and admission to the bar, the
IBA has never published official data relating to the number of interviews
conducted or the number and reasons for disqualification of internships,
apparently because it does not gather such data and does not have a yearly plan
regarding this authority.122 Thus, no research can be undertaken, nor
conclusions be drawn regarding the propriety of the process.
Finally, following the completion of an internship, a candidate for
admission to the bar must pass a bar exam, administered biannually.123 The
IBA oversees the bar examination.124 Until 2016, only judges and lawyers
appointed by the President of the IBA could be members of the examination
committee.125 An Israeli Supreme Court decision from the 1980s discussed the

115. Id. at 131–33.
116. § 29, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
117. Id. at § 30.
118. Id. at § 35(a).
119. Israel Bar Association Rules (Interns Registration and Supervision), 5722-1962, KT 1313,
§ 14 (1962) (Isr.).
120. Id. at § 15(a)–(c).
121. § 27, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
122. STATE COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, REPORT ON CRITICISM OF THE ISRAEL BAR ASSOCIATION
70B, 41–44 (2020).
123. § 1(a), Israel Bar Association Regulations (Procedures for Writing the Examination on the
Laws of the State of Israel regarding Professional Ethics as Applied to Foreign-born Lawyers and the
Practical Occupations), 5723-1962, KT 1395, (1962) (Isr.).
124. § 2(1), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.) (“The Bar shall: Register,
supervise and examine interns.”).
125. § 40(b), Israel Bar Association Law (2016). The Section was revised in 2017. § 2(1), Israel
Bar Association Law.
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examination committee’s makeup, stressing that in determining its
composition, the legislature demanded that its decision-making power be
placed in the hands of an objective body whose members would include a judge
and a lawyer from the public sector.126 The Court also addressed the role of the
examination committee and determined that it has a dual role: drafting the bar
exam questions as well as determining the correct answer for each question.127
Amendment No. 38 (2016) to the law aimed to make the committee more
independent of the IBA and more objective by revising the makeup and
selection criteria for committee membership.128 Amendment No. 38 introduced
two major changes regarding the committee. First, the power of appointment
to the committee was transferred from the President of the IBA to the Minister
of Justice after conducting a mandatory consultation with the President of the
IBA.129 Second, two representatives of legal academia were added to the
committee, and the number of lawyers serving on it was correspondingly
reduced.130 As the Israeli Supreme Court stated while dismissing a challenge
to the Amendment, the examination committee is independent and selfcontained body.131
Amendment No. 38 notwithstanding, the examination committee and the
bar exam remain within the control of the IBA. First, examination fees are paid
directly to the IBA.132 Second, the examination committee conducts its
business out of the IBA’s offices, and the examination committee coordinator
is a salaried employee of the IBA, concurrently serving as a senior official

126. HCJ 110/87 Bloy v. The Minister of Justice, 42(2) PD 373, 376 (1987) (Isr.).
127. Id. at 378. Ten years later, the Court revisited the issue in a case in which interns who failed
the bar exam argued that the decisions of the committee regarding the exam should be void because of
substantive flaws in the process and in the committee makeup. The Court dismissed those allegations.
HCJ 7505/98 Korinaldi v. Israel Bar Association, 53(1) PD 153 (Isr.).
128. § 25, Proposed Israel Bar Association Law (Amendment 38), 2542-2016, HH 937
(correcting § 40 of the same law).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. AdminA 3717/18 Peretz v. IBA Examination Committee, Nevo Legal Database ¶¶ 3, 28–
33 PD (2018) (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Notably, while Justice Amit declared that the
committee is independent, he referred to both respondents—the committee and the IBA—collectively
as “the bar.” Arguably, Justice Amit understood the legal profession to be the true respondent in the
case as opposed to the formal respondent, the committee which drafted the exam.
132. § 2, Israel Bar Association Regulations (Procedures for Writing the Examination on the
Laws of the State of Israel regarding Professional Ethics as Applied to Foreign-born Lawyers and the
Practical Occupations), 5723-1962, KT 1395 (1962) (Isr.).
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responsible for internships and examinations at the IBA.133 Third, logistically,
the IBA manages and conducts the examination.134 Fourth, if an intern appeals
to the court challenging the examination, IBA lawyers or IBA funded lawyers
represent the examination committee.135
The IBA’s de facto control over the bar exam has proven to be important
and controversial. Since the mid-1990s, several new law schools have opened
(the total number of law schools in Israel has risen from three to fourteen).136
As a result, the number of candidates for admission to the bar has increased
many times over, to the point that Israel has the highest number of lawyers per
capita in the world.137 In recent decades the increased number of lawyers and
corresponding increased competition in the market for legal services have
become issues of concern to many lawyers who have demanded that the criteria
for admission to the profession be made more stringent.138 Initially,
notwithstanding this muttering, little was done, and the bar exam and its pass
rate remained unchanged. Historically, for many years the examinees’ pass rate
stood at about 70%–80%.139 In July 2015, a new elected President of the IBA
who had campaigned on a platform of fighting against the flooding of the
profession by means of introducing more stringent admission criteria, entered
office.140 In the first examination following his election and since, the pass rate
fell sharply to 60%.141
133. Menachem Shtauber, What’s Going on at the Israel Bar Association’s Examining
Committee,
GLOBES
(Isr.
daily
newspaper)
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001251041 [https://perma.cc/M2LV-7WHU].
134. §§ 7–9, Israel Bar Association Regulations (Procedures for Writing the Examination on the
Laws of the State of Israel regarding Professional Ethics as Applied to Foreign-born Lawyers and the
Practical Occupations), 5723-1962, KT 1395 (1962) (Isr.).
135. See, e.g., HCJ 110/87 Bloy v The Minister of Justice, 42(2) PD 373, 376 (1987) (Isr.).
136. Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra note 87, at 611.
137. Id. at 610.
138. See generally Katvan, supra note 72. (describing the two hemispheres in the legal education
and the profession that emerged in Israel since the opening of the private law colleges in the 1990s.).
See also Kricheli-Katz, Rosen-Zvi & Ziv, supra note 72, at 438–41.
139. Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra note 87, at 612.
140. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 152.
141. Limor Zer-Gutman, Opinion, There is a Material Flaw in the Bar Association’s
“Certification
Exams,”
GLOBES
(Isr.
daily
newspaper)
(July
30,
2018),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001247937 [https://perma.cc/P7TZ-R5UR] (author
translated). The Op. Ed. documents the pass rates of the bar exam from May 2010 until May 2018.
The sharp decline in the pass rate starts with the November 2015 exam and continues since. See also
HCJ 9053/15 Macnes v. Minister of Justice IBA Examination Committee, Nevo Legal Database (Apr.
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The public record indicates that this former President of the IBA was
involved in decisions relating to several examinations.142 For example, the
chairperson of the Parliament’s State Control Committee, after hearing
testimonies by and arguments for interns who failed to pass the 2018 exams,
stated: “A dreadful situation was revealed, where in practice there is no
separation between the examination committee and the Bar, and there is a real
concern for the improper involvement of the Bar in the examination process,
all based on the arguments and documents presented to the committee.”143 In
this special hearing an IBA representative failed to provide proper answers to
the interns’ claims regarding the involvement of the IBA and to the evidence
showing that the committee was not an objective professional body.144
In response to an administrative petition filed by interns who failed a new
format of the bar exam in 2017, the IBA argued that the low pass rate was due
to the poor quality of law students rather than the alleged difficulty of the
exam.145 The argument was based on two figures presented to the Court: the
relatively high pass rate of first-time takers as opposed to repeat-takers,146 and
the distribution of the pass rates among graduates of Israel’s law schools.
Specifically, whereas over 90% of graduates of high-ranked university-based

19, 2016) (Isr.) (by subscription, in Hebrew). The petition and the decision relate to the November
2015 exam.
142. See, for example, the Minister of Justice’s decision regarding the August 2018 examination,
made following a meeting and consultation with the chairman of the examination committee and the
President of the IBA. See Efrat Neuman, Good News for Legal Interns: Questions Disqualified and
Mitigations in the Next Examination, THE MARKER (Isr. daily newspaper) (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.themarker.com/law/1.6361819 [https://perma.cc/R6VC-7XKT] (author translated).
143. Protocol No. 04278018 of State Control Committee of the 21st Knesset, Nov. 14, 2018
(author translated quotation).
144. Id.
145. AdminA 3717/18 Peretz v. IBA Examination Committee, Nevo Legal Database, ¶ 4 PD,
(2018) (Isr.) (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
146. Id. at ¶¶ 28–33. In the December 2020 examination, 74% of those who took the exam for
the first time passed. In the most recent exam in June 2021, 70% of those who took the exam for the
first time passed. Bar Association Examinations—December 2020 47% of the Examinees Failed,
GLOBES,
(Isr.
daily
newspaper)
(Jan.
11,
2021),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001356755 [https://perma.cc/Q8RY-QYJH]; IBA
Press
Release,
THE
MARKER
(Isr.
daily
newspaper),
https://www.themarker.com/embeds/pdf_upload/2021/20210715-195438.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WEN7-FVL2].
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law schools passed, only 40%–60% of graduates of the newer, lower-ranked,
private law colleges passed the exam.147
In the landmark Peretz case, challenging the IBA’s reasoning, failing
interns raised two principal arguments. First, the change in the degree of
difficulty of the examination and the subsequent modification of its format were
implemented effective immediately and applied retroactively to those already
progressing through the qualification track (i.e., pursuing undergraduate law
studies or internships).148 In contrast, argued the interns, the extension of the
period of internship (from one year to one and a half years), which was adopted
in the same Amendment No. 39 to the Act, was applied only to those who had
not yet commenced their law studies.149 Those already on the qualification
track had arguably relied on the well-established, higher pass rate, forming a
reasonable expectation of completing their qualifications and becoming
lawyers. Second, the interns complained about flaws in the examination itself.
In Peretz, the Supreme Court noted a number of such flaws—the
unreasonable level of knowledge required, including esoteric information
unfamiliar to even experienced lawyers, the extremely long list of statutes that
must be learned, the very short time available, and more.150 The Court further
noted that the revised bar exam appeared to have been designed to limit
admission by failing a relatively high number of candidates as opposed to
ascertaining minimal competency.151 The Court clarified that the proper
purpose of the bar exam is neither to sort nor limit the number of lawyers in
Israel. Rather, the purpose of such an exam is to protect the public interest by
147. Id. at ¶ 5 (IBA answer in Peretz). In the December 2020 exam, 94% of the Hebrew
University Faculty of Law (an established elite law school) graduates passed, while only 33% of the
Zefat Academic College of Law (newer state-funded law school in the northern periphery) graduates
passed the exam. Bar Association Examinations, supra note 146. Similarly, in the recent June 2021
exam, 96% percent of the Hebrew University Faculty of Law graduates passed while only 50% of the
graduates of Netanya College of Law (lower-ranked private college) graduates passed the exam. IBA
Press Release, supra note 146.
148. See HCJ 2189/18 Vaknin Sokron-Sherman v. IBA, Nevo Legal Database (2018) (Isr.) (by
subscription, in Hebrew); HCJ 9053/15 Macnes v. Minister of Justice IBA Examination Committee,
Nevo Legal Database (2016) (Isr.) (by subscription, in Hebrew) (there were three respondents to this
petition: Minister of Justice, IBA, and the Examination Committee).
149. § 36, Proposed Israel Bar Association Law (Amendment 39), 2657-2017, HH 1107 766,
772.
150. Peretz v. IBA Examination Committee at ¶¶ 28–31. The court stated that examinees were
required to answer difficult and sometimes esoteric questions, in all legal areas, and questioned whether
even highly knowledgeable, experienced lawyers could pass the exam. The court disqualified two
exam questions in addition to three questions disqualified by the lower court.
151. Id. at ¶ 31.
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ensuring that only those who are competent (studied law, trained during the
internship, and passed the qualifying examination) will pass and be allowed to
provide legal services to the public.152
The lack of fairness claim was bolstered by the stark decline in the pass rate
following Amendment No. 39. The pass rate for the second exam in the new
format (in late 2017) was 32%, increasing to 38% after a number of exam
questions were tossed out by the courts.153 Indeed, about a month after the exam
results became public, the Minister of Justice announced that the bar exam
should be fair, and that accordingly, starting with the next examination, a
number of mitigating factors will rectify the new format—extra time, a
shortened list of statutes to be learned, etc.154 But the public outcry did not calm
down. Rather, in November 2018, the Parliament’s State Control Committee
conducted a special hearing concerning “the injustice and the wrongful harm
caused to the interns that participated in the 2018 exams.”155 A group of sixtyone Parliament members, notably a majority in Israel’s 120-seat Parliament,
signed a petition calling on the Minister of Justice to address the injustice.156
The public outrage continued as more candidates failed each exam, some of
whom failed repeatedly.157 In January 2019, the Minister of Justice announced
a compromise with the IBA and its examination committee—the passing exam
score was set at 60 (previously 65), and this lower mark would be applied
retroactively to the three past exams with the lowest passing rates.158 As of
2021, after each exam, interns have appealed to the court system claiming
unfairness and seeking to disqualify unreasonably difficult questions.159

152. Id. at ¶ 29.
153. See Neuman, supra note 142.
154. Id.
155. Protocol No. 04278018 of State Control Committee of the 21st Knesset, Nov. 14, 2018
(author translated quotation).
156. Letter from 61 Parliament Members to Ayelet Shaked, Minister of Justice (Nov. 3, 2018)
(on file with author).
157. Peretz v. IBA Examination Committee at ¶ 5 (Justice Amit’s decision) (by subscription, in
Hebrew).
158. Menachem Shtauber, There is a Deal: The Passing Score in the Bar Association’s
Certification Exams Drops to 60, GLOBES (Isr. daily newspaper) (Jan. 16, 2019).
159. See, e.g., Nitzan Shafir, Bar Exams—December 2020: 47% of Examinees Failed, GLOBES
(Isr. daily newspaper) (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001356755
[https://perma.cc/W9G8-SUD7]. In that exam, 47% failed. 74% of those taking the exam for the first
time passed. 92% of elite universities’ law school graduates passed compared to 49% of lower-ranked
law colleges’ graduates. Id.
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Israeli lawyers are required to pay an annual membership fee to the IBA, as
a condition-precedent for practicing law.160 The IBA’s annual fees are not
considered high—they range from USD 205 a year for junior members to a
maximum of USD 340 for the most senior lawyers.161 Until 2016, the IBA had
exclusive control over the fees. As a result of Amendment No. 38 to the law,
fee increases now generally require the approval of the Minister of Justice.162
Membership fees are the main component of the annual budget of the IBA,
which too is under the sole control of the IBA.163 Limiting the number of new
entrants might thus seem counterintuitive, reducing the IBA’s income, yet
given the increased number of lawyers since the 1990s, the IBA enjoys healthy
finances.164 Following Amendment No. 38, the IBA is required to submit its
annual budget and financial statements to the Minister of Justice and make them
available for public scrutiny on the IBA website.165 However, the law does not
grant the Minister of Justice the power to approve the budget.166
ii. Self-Interest and Opaque Discipline
The discipline of Israeli lawyers is primarily handled by internal bodies of
the IBA that enjoy broad independence with little external oversight. This selfregulated system operated undisturbed until a 2008 statutory “reform.”167 The
process of amending the law took five years, during which time the IBA exerted
massive and successful pressure on the legislature.168 While important changes
were made, the IBA’s self-regulatory powers remained intact. The law
continues to grant the IBA exclusive authority in this regard, with the duty to
160. § 93(a)(1), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
161. BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 5764 42 (2020) (Isr.). The law allows
the IBA to set different annual fees based on seniority, age, and area of practice. See § 93(a)(3), Israel
Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.). The IBA uses the first criteria to differentiate between
below 3 years of seniority and above, and the second criteria to give considerable discount to lawyers
from the age of 67 and above. See generally, BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 5764
(2020) (Isr.).
162. § 93(a)(1), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
163. See, e.g., BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 5764 43 (2020) (Isr.) (annual
fees account for 99% of the annual budget).
164. Id. (The annual budget is almost 58 million shekels or approximately USD 17.8 million).
165. § 95(e), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.). Starting in 2002, the IBA
has published its annual report on its website.
166. See id. (the law routinely specifies the powers of the Minister of Justice, but the power to
approve the IBA’s annual budget is not explicitly granted to the Minister).
167. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 145.
168. Id. at 153.
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“take good care to observe, supervise and ensure the standards and ethics of the
legal profession.”169
The disciplinary system in Israel is divided into two stages. At each stage,
the autonomy and independence of the IBA is preserved because the hearing
and the decision-making capacities are confined to the IBA body which wields
a variety of powers.170 In the first intake stage, the grievance is examined and
a decision is made as to whether to dismiss the grievance or continue the
investigation.171 The authority to make this decision is vested in the hands of
six district committees and one national ethics committee.172 In the second
stage, a decision is made whether to file a disciplinary charge against the
lawyer.173 If a charge is submitted, it is managed by a representative of the
same ethics committee that decided to submit the charge.174 Each district has a
disciplinary court, which hears and decides the charge.175 The panel in each
disciplinary court is made up of lawyer volunteers.176
Self-regulation is evident in several key features of the disciplinary process.
First, only IBA bodies—the ethics committees—have the authority to hear and
decide grievances about lawyers.177 Second, the authority to decide whether to
submit a formal disciplinary charge against a lawyer is solely within the
purview of the IBA bodies.178 Third, in the second stage, in which deliberations
are conducted exploring the disciplinary charge, the first two tiers of
169. § 2(3), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.) (author translated quotation).
170. Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra note 87, at 603.
171. § 63, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.); §§ 2–9 Israel Bar Association
Rules (Procedure in the Disciplinary Courts), 5755-2015, KT 7520, (2015) (Isr.).
172. § 18(b), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.), states that in each IBA
district there shall be an ethics committee. Subsequent sections specify the makeup of the committee
and the nomination of its members.
173. §§ 63–64, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.); §§ 2–9, Israel Bar
Association Regulations (Procedure in the Disciplinary Courts), 5755-2015, KT 7520, (2015) (Isr.).
174. § 14, Israel Bar Association Rules (Procedure in the Disciplinary Courts), 5755-2015, KT
7520, (2015).
175. § 15, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.), states in relevant part: “(A)
Each District of the Bar shall have a District Disciplinary Court whose members shall be elected, once
every four years, from amongst the suitably qualified members registered in that District; the number
of members of each District Disciplinary court shall be prescribed by rules.” See also §§ 14–51, 57,
Israel Bar Association Rules (Procedure in the Disciplinary Courts), 5755-2015, KT 7520, (2015)
(Isr.); §§ 14, 16, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
176. § 16, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
177. § 3, Israel Bar Association Regulations (Procedures in the Disciplinary Courts), 5755-2015,
KT 7520, (2015) (Isr.).
178. Id. at § 9.
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adjudication consist of IBA bodies and the panels are made up solely of lawyers
without the participation of any public representative or external supervision.179
Only the third tier, which is the second instance of appeal (available as a matter
of right) entails the state court system.180
Notably, while the law allows grievances to be submitted and decided by
two external, non-IBA bodies—the Attorney General and the State
Attorney181—the use of this parallel authority is rare and in fact almost never
applied.182 The Attorney General has issued a directive stating that the
circumstances in which they or the State Attorney will use their authority are
rare and will be confined to cases where a fundamental flaw has occurred in the
conduct of the district ethics committee or the national ethics committee.183 The
public record reveals only a few cases in which the Attorney General or State
Attorney used this authority.184 In practice, therefore, grievances are
adjudicated and decided by the IBA ethics committees, in which only one or
two public representatives sit—jurists who are not members of the
profession.185
All disciplinary charges, regardless of their severity, are heard by the
district disciplinary court of the district in which the lawyer is registered,186

179. See § 2, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.); Zer-Gutman, supra note 74,
at 153–55.
180. § 71, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.) (“Both the accused and the
complainant may appeal the judgment of a National Disciplinary Court to the District Court in
Jerusalem, within thirty days from the date the judgment was handed down. The Central committee
and the Attorney General may also appeal, even though they were not the complainants.”) (author
translated quotation).
181. Id. at § 63.
182. Limor Zer-Gutman, The Reform in Lawyers’ Disciplinary System: Were the Deficiencies
Corrected?, (2010) 15 HAMISHPAT L. REV. 27, 34 (author translated).
183. Rules of Discipline, 10.1000 Attorney General Guidelines (updated Aug. 18, 2010) (“The
Attorney General and the State Attorney as Complainants According to the Israel Bar Association
law”) (author translated).
184. Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 34; See also GABRIEL KLING, ETHICS FOR LAWYERS 13
(Isr. Bar Assoc. 2001) (Isr.).
185. § 18(b), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.). Further regulation limits
the number of the members in each of the seven committees. See Israel Bar Association Rules (The
Total Number of the Ethics Committee Members) (2009) (Isr.).
186. § 64(a), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.) (“disciplinary offence shall
be tried before the District Disciplinary Court of the district where the accused advocate is
registered.”); § 11, Israel Bar Association Rules (Procedure in the Disciplinary Courts), 5755-2015,
KT No. 7523, (2015) (Isr.) (author translated quotation).
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staffed by three-member panels made up of lawyers.187 Panels adjudicate the
case and hear the evidence and witnesses.188 The disciplinary law reform
process of 2008 was supposed to include the integration of public
representatives as judges in the district courts; however, this measure was
successfully opposed by the IBA.189 The reform succeeded in making one
change to the disciplinary courts—previously, judges were selected by
politicians of the IBA so their appointment was based on party lines.190 This
procedure was criticized by the Supreme Court.191 The State Comptroller’s
report from 1999 also noted this problem.192 The reform changed the process
of appointing judges to disciplinary panels. It has been placed under the
supervision of an appointment committee headed by a retired judge.193
The first appeal as a matter of right against a decision of a district
disciplinary court is to the national disciplinary court.194 There is only one
national disciplinary court, and its size is determined by the IBA.195 The
Attorney General and the State Attorney may intercede before the national
disciplinary court even if they were not parties to the proceedings at the first
instance.196 This mechanism is designed to ensure that control over the appeal
process will not be confined to IBA bodies but will also be overseen by an
external body. The Attorney General may also oversee the appeal by appearing,
pleading, and presenting evidence at every stage of the disciplinary hearing,

187. § 63, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
188. These disciplinary courts are not subject to the rules of evidence applied in state courts;
however, in practice, the disciplinary courts try to act in accordance with the rules of evidence. See
§ 67, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.); §§ 28–41, Israel Bar Association Rules
(Procedure in the Disciplinary Courts), 5772–1962, KT 7520 (Isr.) (2015).
189. Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 45 (explaining that in Israel, disciplinary courts of other
professions often include judges who are not members of the profession, i.e., public representants).
This practice was raised during the regulation process in the Parliament regarding the reform. Id.
190. Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 47.
191. HCJ 1302/96 Independence & Change Party v. Tel Aviv District Committee, 50 PD 749,
757–58 (1996) (Isr.).
192. STATE COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, REPORT ON CRITICISM OF THE ISRAEL BAR ASSOCIATION
, 21 (1999) (Isr.).
193. § 18(d), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.) (The appointment committee
has seven members to be selected by the Minister of Justice after consultation with the President of the
IBA).
194. Id. at § 70.
195. Id. at § 14.
196. Id. at § 70.
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even if the Attorney General was not a party to it from the outset.197 These
authority and external supervisory powers are almost never utilized.198
Only the third disciplinary tier, which is the second appeal (by right), takes
place before the regular state court system.199 It should be emphasized that in
terms of the appeals procedure, a second appeal is almost always by way of
leave.200 A rare exception to this principle in Israeli law is found in the
disciplinary process relating to lawyers, where the second appeal is allowed as
a matter of right.201 This renders the disciplinary process of lawyers more time
consuming than other professions’ processes. Other professions in Israel have
only one stage of professional disciplinary court from which an appeal by right
is made to the court, and a second appeal to the Supreme Court is only by
permission.202 For lawyers, an appeal to the Supreme Court is the third appeal,
and it is also by permission.203 One may view the length of the process for
lawyers (three appeals instead of the usual two) as a benefit that safeguards
lawyers’ rights.
Overall, the entire disciplinary process raises due process and lack of
transparency concerns. The main concern is that the system does not provide
proper supervision over lawyers that are being protected by hardly getting
disciplined. The decision whether or not to pursue disciplinary charges
continues to be made, as it has for almost 60 years, by ethics committees. These
ethics committees are bodies of the IBA and are controlled by IBA elected
politicians, either directly as sitting members of the committee or indirectly
through the appointment of sitting members of the committee and the ethics
attorney of the committee, all without effective external supervision.
The purpose of the 2008 reform was to separate the disciplinary system
from the political division of the elected IBA officials so that the decision
whether to submit a disciplinary charge would be made by a neutral committee

197. Id. at § 41; Israel Bar Association Rules (Procedure in the Disciplinary Courts), 5755-2015,
KT No. 7520 (2015) (Isr.).
198. Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 35–36.
199. § 71a, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
200. Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 35.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., §§ 17e, 44c, The Medical Profession Ordinance (1976) (Isr.).
203. The Judiciary: The Court System, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS.,
https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/democracy/pages/the%20judiciary%20the%20court%20system.aspx [https://perma.cc/XUS6-2BUT].
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appointed by an external appointments committee.204 The IBA strongly
objected to transferring the power to initiate disciplinary charges to a grievances
committee, characterizing the move as a material violation of the autonomy that
guaranteed the independence of the profession and its separation from state
institutions.205 The IBA counter proposed that a “Professional Grievance
Administration” be set up alongside the district ethics committee; an ethics
attorney would be appointed to serve in the new body and would have the
function of coordinating the professional handling of all grievances and
providing the ethics committee with a professional opinion on every
grievance.206 The decision-making power would remain in the hands of the
ethics committee, which would be entitled to adopt or reject the opinion.207 In
the IBA’s view, such a committee would preserve the autonomy of the
disciplinary system while improving the decision-making process, as the
decision-making body would have the benefit of a detailed opinion prepared by
a paid, professional entity which is non-political and does not stand for
election.208
During the five years in which the legislature deliberated the reform, the
IBA succeeded in repelling any suggestion that would have compromised its
self-regulation and autonomy in the sphere of the disciplinary system.209 In
practice, the reform adopted the IBA’s proposal, but instead of establishing a
professional grievances authority the IBA assigned its proposed functions
directly to the ethics attorney.210 The ethics attorney is purportedly an
independent professional working alongside the ethics committee and is
perceived as one of the elements separating ethics from politics by helping to
detach the district committees from the decision as to whether to submit a

204. Memorandum of the Israel Bar Association Law, Changes in Disciplinary Law and Other
Provisions (Amendment), 5763–2003, SH 127 (Isr.).
205. Dror Arad-Ayalon, Publication of Disciplinary Hearings and the Establishment of a
Professional Complaints Authority, LAWYER, 2004 at. 45, 48 (author translated).
206. Zer Gutman, supra note 74, at 154.
207. Id.
208. Arad-Ayalon, supra note 205, at 48.
209. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 153.
210. § 18c, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.) (“(a) Ethics attorneys will
serve alongside the National Ethics Committee and alongside any District Ethics Committee . . . . (b)
Ethics attorneys will examine grievances regarding disciplinary offences by lawyers handled by the
ethics committee alongside which they serve and will make recommendations to the committee; ethics
attorneys will also represent the ethics committee alongside which they serve in proceedings before
the disciplinary courts and courts, and will advise the committee in any related matter.”).
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disciplinary charge.211 The ethics attorney, however, is a salaried employee of
the IBA and in practice often defers to the chair of the ethics committee with
whom the attorney works.212 Although the ethics attorney is elected for a fixed
term,213 the ethics committee can dismiss them,214 so the degree to which the
attorney is independent is questionable. Thus, the reform failed to produce an
independent and objective body in the first stage of examining the grievance
which is needed to guarantee due process.
In the second stage, where disciplinary charges are heard and decided in the
disciplinary court, due process concerns lay in unfulfilled separation of powers.
The IBA investigates the grievance, decides whether to file a disciplinary
charge, prosecutes the lawyer, and finally adjudicates the grievance.
Particularly grave is the fact that the judicial body—the disciplinary courts in
the first two tiers—is an organ of the IBA, which at the same time acts as
prosecutor.
A recent disciplinary case illustrates the due process danger inherent in this
state of affairs. In the case, the ethics attorney of the IBA’s ethics committee
submitted a request to the appointments committee to dismiss a panel-judge
from office after she refused to approve several arrangements made with the
accused on the grounds that they were illegal.215 Although the appointments
committee rejected the request because no grounds for dismissal had been
proven,216 the fact that the prosecution can demand the dismissal of a judge
because of dissatisfaction with their rulings shows that these judges are not
genuinely independent and casts a doubt on the due process guarantee of the
process.
Moreover, in a series of investigative reporting, a commentator revealed
how the then President of the IBA was intervening and influencing the
decisions of ethics committee, allegedly in his personal interest and those of his

211. L. AND JUST. COMM., 17TH KNESSET, PROTOCOL NO. 416 OF THE CONST. 39 (Jan. 9, 2008).
A dispute arose in the committee regarding the nature of the ethics attorney, because inter alia, the
Aloni Committee’s report, which had recommended this appointment, was not sufficiently clear. Id.,
at 39–49.
212. Regarding the manner of appointment, the length of the term of office and the manner of
its termination, see Israel Bar Association Regulation (Appointment of Ethics Attorneys to the Ethics
Committees and Termination of their Office), 5770–2010, KT 6864, 737 (Isr).
213. Id. at § 3(a) (setting a five-year term, which can be extended by five additional years).
214. § 18b(g), The Bar Association Act, 5721-1961 (Isr.).
215. Letter from Adi Feiner-Gilboa, Exec. to the Appointments Comm. (Sept. 16, 2015) (on file
with author) (author translated).
216. Id.
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political allies.217 One case, for example, involved a law firm that was
seemingly regularly violating the advertising rules, but all the complaints filed
against that firm were dismissed by the ethics committee.218 Even complaints
from former clients about violations of the ethical duties to the clients were
dismissed.219 The news report claimed that the firm was closely aligned with
the IBA President, helping him establish his relationship with the Minister of
Justice.220 Despite a public outcry, those allegations were not formally
investigated.221 Arguably in an attempt to stop the independent reporter from
publishing more articles, the IBA filed a defamation suit against her and her
newspaper seeking damages.222 Yet, before the defamation case was decided,
the then IBA President resigned from office after being implicated in another
controversy,223 and the new elected IBA President withdrew the lawsuit.224 The
new elected IBA politician stated that “attacks against journalists are attacks
against the democratic sphere, and we cannot tolerate them. The IBA, as the
defender of the Rule of Law, must stand loud and clear against any personal
attacks on journalists and the media.”225
The disciplinary proceedings held by the IBA also violate the principle of
transparency. The ethics committees do not publish minutes of their
deliberations or their reasoning.226 From time to time, complaints are lodged

217. Gila Pieshov, “Effie is coming soon”: What is Happening in Liron Sanda's Law Firm?, HAMAKOM HCI HAM BAGEHENOM (Isr. independent journalism) (Mar. 5, 2019).
218. Id.
219. See Sharon Spurer, Will IBA Suspend David Shimron as it Did to a Lawyer that Cursed the
Lover of Her Husband, HA-MAKOM HCI HAM BAGEHENOM (Isr. independent journalism), Nov.
14, 2017.
220. Gor Megido, The Judges, the Census, and the Sympathetic Coverage: The Affairs that Were
Never Investigated in Effi Naveh’s Case, THE MARKER (Isr. daily newspaper) (Apr. 2, 2019), (author
translated).
221. Gor Megido The Deal Between Ayelet Shaked and Effi Naveh—and The Documents that
can Implicate the Minister of Justice, THE MARKER (Isr. daily newspaper) (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.themarker.com/law/.premium-1.7081797
[https://perma.cc/H4ZB-D5ZM]
(author
translated).
222. Bini Ashkenazi, With no Lawsuits Against Journalists: The Israeli Bar Withdrew Today its
Suit Against Sharon Spurer, THE MARKER (Isr. daily newspaper) (July 16, 2019), (author translated).
223. Anat Roeh, Effi Naveh Resigned from Heading the IBA, CALCALIST (Isr. daily newspaper)
(Jan.
17,
2019),
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3754495,00.html
[https://perma.cc/PD6F-B2NU] (author translated).
224. Ashkenazi, supra note 222.
225. Hen Ma’anit, Now it is Official: The Court Dismissed the Legal Suit Against Sharon Sporer,
GLOBES (Isr. daily newspaper) (Sep. 11, 2019), (author translated).
226. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 154.
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regarding the shelving of grievances involving cronies.227 For example, in one
case, a court upheld the claim of an accused lawyer alleging selective
enforcement by the ethics committee, which had decided to submit a
disciplinary charge against him.228 Such cases, combined with the lack of
transparency in the deliberations of the ethics committees, give rise to a real
suspicion of unequal application of the law and a resultant violation of the right
to equality and due process.
In 2008, as part of the reform, the IBA was instructed to publish all
disciplinary judgments in an open database available for public scrutiny, free
of charge.229 Incredibly, prior to the reform for nearly fifty years, the public
could not readily ascertain which lawyers had been disciplined except for
disbarred and suspended attorneys. The stated purpose of the disciplinary
system is to protect the public from misbehaving lawyers.230 This goal cannot
be achieved without disciplinary transparency. The Supreme Court only began
publishing the names of lawyers who appealed discipline to it in 1995.231
However, that decision did not bind the IBA, which continued to conceal the
names of disciplined lawyers until the law was amended in 2008.232 This is a
striking example of the preference given to the self-interest of lawyers at the
cost of the public’s interest and its right to know material information about
lawyers.
In theory, the right of the public to receive information may be broader than
the right to review the disciplinary judgments database and may also include
227. Yuval Yoaz, Their Own Law: Are Bar Association Officials Subject to Another Code of
Ethics?,
GLOBES
(Isr.
daily
newspaper)
(Mar.
25,
2010),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000549292 [https://perma.cc/NB9G-R8P5] (author
translated); Yuval Yoaz, Judge Yitzhak Shimoni Tried to Influence a Disciplinary Proceeding, GLOBES
(Isr. daily newspaper) (Feb. 24, 2011), https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000626043
[https://perma.cc/Z5DY-7L95] (author translated). An e-mail from the IBA during the IBA elections
was entitled “Adv. Moshe Taib was one of Adv. Barzilai’s supporters throughout his current term.
Then Taib came to the Ethics Committee [a grievance against Mr. Taib was filed and later dismissed
by the committee]. Today he is a supporter of Adv. Naveh [Chairperson of the Ethics Committee who
competed in the IBA elections against Mr. Barzilai]” E-mail from IBA Mailing System (May 14, 2015,
15:44) (on file with author) (author translated).
228. BDA 117/14 Tel Aviv District Committee v. Eron, 15(64) PE 748 (2015) (Isr.).
229. Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 55–57; § 69(b), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961,
SH 374 (Isr.).
230. IBAA 3467/00 IBA District Committee in Tel-Aviv v. Tzltener, 55(2) PD 895, 900–01
(2002) (Isr.) (explaining that the two goals of the lawyers’ disciplinary system are protecting the public
from incompetent lawyers and enhancing the profession’s standing and reputation).
231. HCJ 6005/93 Aliash v. Judge Zur, 49(1) PD 159, 165, 175 (1995) (Isr.).
232. Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 55.
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receiving information about the disciplinary record of a particular lawyer. Such
transparency could protect the public, yet in Israel, disciplinary records are
unavailable for review. To realize the public’s right to know and guarantee
protection against misbehaving lawyers who have been disciplined, it is
necessary to establish a database containing the disciplinary history of all
lawyers. A client who wishes to retain a particular lawyer will be able to search
the database and determine whether the lawyer was subjected to disciplinary
charges and what decision was made in respect to that lawyer.
Proper transparency and protection of the rights of litigants in the
disciplinary system also require the establishment of an ombudsman for
disciplinary action. Currently, the IBA’s internal comptroller handles all
complaints relating to the activities of the IBA, including those concerning the
disciplinary system.233 The IBA’s internal comptroller is an employee of the
IBA, beholden to the appointing political apparatus and, therefore, ineffective
and incapable of ensuring the proper handling of complaints concerning the
disciplinary process. In 2019, for example, an IBA spokesperson confirmed
that the then IBA internal comptroller never filed a single report during her
seven years in office.234
iii. Self-Interest and the Strict Enforcement of UPL Rules
Another key aspect of the exclusive jurisdiction of the legal profession in
Israel relates to the monopoly of the profession over the provision of legal
services. The monopoly is enforced in part via UPL rules that prohibit the
practice of law by nonlawyers. UPL rules in Israel are very broad compared to
other countries.235 The rules were established in the law and have not changed
since.236 There are two classes of rules in the law—one found in a section that
applies to “trespassers on the profession” and the other in a section that applies
to lawyers and which prohibits them to share work or income with a
nonlawyer.237 In 1992, the IBA initiated a new mandatory rule of professional
conduct prohibiting lawyers from working in an entity that offers legal services

233. §§ 5, 18(a), Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
234. Anat Roeh, The IBA Presents: 7 Years in Office, Salary of 2.4 Million Shekels and 0
Reports, CALCALIST (Isr. daily newspaper) (Feb. 24, 2019), (author translated).
235. See generally Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], Policy Roundtables—Competitive
Restrictions in Legal Professions 2007, DAF/COMP(2007)39 (Apr. 27, 2009),
https://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/40080343.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZGQ-XSAS].
236. Ziv, supra note 67, at 178.
237. § 58, Israel Bar Association Law, 5721-1961, SH 374 (Isr.).
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other than a law firm or receiving clients referred to them by entities that violate
the UPL rules.238
For nearly sixty years, the IBA has been able to enforce UPL rules
vigorously through disciplinary law and civil lawsuits instituted against those
who violate these prohibitions239—blocking competition that could benefit the
public. Throughout the years, the IBA has been conducting an uncompromising
battle against anyone trying to enter the legal services market and harm the
economic interests of lawyers.240 The IBA has consistently justified
enforcement of the UPL rules in terms of the public interest, namely, the need
to protect the public and ensure a high standard of legal services.241 According
to this argument, only lawyers who have completed their studies, internships,
passed the bar exam, and are subject to rules of professional conduct and
disciplinary enforcement can guarantee these objectives.242
The IBA’s ongoing UPL campaign spans a long list of civil lawsuits filed
against individuals and entities on the ground that they have trespassed upon
lawyers’ exclusive jurisdiction. These claims are based not only on complaints
received from the public and individual lawyers but also on investigations
initiated by the IBA itself in order to identify trespassers.243 A review of the
IBA’s budget in the past four years (2017–2020) indicates that 7% of its annual
budget is allocated to this struggle.244 According to a recent IBA report, during
2020 the committee handled 250 complaints and initiated a few dozen private
investigations designed to collect sufficient evidence to file civil suits and
request court injunctions.245

238. § 11B, Israel Bar Association Rules (Professional Ethics), 5758-1998, (1986) (Isr.).
239. Ziv, supra note 67, at 179.
240. Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra note 87, at 604.
241. See, for example, the IBA’s enforcement actions suing public and private agencies
purporting to assist clients with disability, illness, or injury entitlements. CivA 4223/12 Centre for
Realization of Medical Rights v. The Israel Bar Association, Nevo Legal Database 17 (2014) (Isr.) (by
subscription, in Hebrew). See also Ziv, supra note 67, at 180–83.
242. See, e.g., HCJ 9596/02 Pitsiy Nimratz v. The Israel Bar Association, 58(5) PD 792 (2004)
(Isr.).
243. See BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 5764 143 (2020) (Isr.).
244. BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 5777 30 (2017) (Isr.); BAR
ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 2009 25 (2018) (Isr.); BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL
ACTIVITY REPORT 5769 40 (2018) (Isr.); BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 5764 42
(2020)
(author
translated).
The
annual
reports
can
be
found
at
https://www.israelbar.org.il/article.asp?catid=5&menu=1 [https://perma.cc/52AZ-KNG6].
245. BAR ASSOCIATION—ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 5764 142–45 (2020) (Isr.).
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A notable example of the UPL campaign is the battle orchestrated by the
IBA against NGOs and law school legal clinics, which lasted a decade.246 The
IBA sought to strictly apply the UPL rules to these institutions,247 despite the
fact that the rules were originally aimed to address the activities of commercial
for-profit entities, not of NGOs and educational institutions.248 In the eyes of
the IBA, even nonprofit entities undermine lawyers’ ability to make a living.249
The IBA’s campaign severely undermined the NGOs and clinics’ activities and
greatly limited their ability to achieve their goal—expanding access to justice
for disadvantaged sectors of society.250 Notably, pro bono in Israel is very
limited,251 such that the IBA’s struggle against NGOs and law school legal
clinics in enforcing the UPL rules was limiting access to justice.
The IBA’s stance led the NGOs and clinics to submit an amicus curiae brief
for an appeal submitted to the Supreme Court in the matter of a commercial
company called The Center for Realization of Medical Rights (CMR).252 The
company assisted its clients in securing medical and disability entitlements
from governmental organizations, primarily the National Social Security.253
CMR was held liable in a suit for professional trespass filed against it by the
IBA.254 CMR appealed to the Supreme Court.255 Supporting CMR’s appeal,
the nonprofits argued that the IBA’s broad interpretation of the UPL rules
impaired access to justice of disadvantaged groups, which did not have the
resources to hire a lawyer.256

246. Limor Zer-Gutman, The Israeli Bar and the Legal Clinics: Anatomy of a Struggle, 17
HAMISHPAT L. REV. 59, 60–62 (2013) [hereinafter The Israeli Bar and the Legal Clinics] (author
translated). See also Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra note 87, at 609–10 (exploring the history and
current practice realities of NGO and law school legal clinics).
247. Zer-Gutman, The Israeli Bar and the Legal Clinics, supra note 246, at 65–72.
248. Ziv, supra note 67, at 178–79.
249. The Israeli Bar and the Legal Clinics, supra note 246, at 65.
250. Id. at 62 n.3 (citing a letter that the representatives of the NGOs and legal clinics wrote to
the head of the National Ethics Committee, explaining that the committee’s decision undermines their
ability to provide help for those in need).
251. Neta Ziv, Pro Bono Representation of Refugee Seekers by Big Law Firms: A Political Say
or Humanitarian Act?, 12 MA'ASEI MISHPAT 82, 93–94 (2021).
252. CivA 4223/12 The Centre for Realization of Medical Rights v. The Israel Bar Association,
Nevo Legal Database 1–3 (2014) (Isr.) (by subscription, in Hebrew).
253. Id. at ¶ 18.
254. CivA (DC Jer) 9270/07 The Israel Bar Association v. The Center for Realization of Medical
Rights (2012) (Isr.).
255. The Centre for Realization of Medical Rights v. The Israel Bar Association at ¶ 79.
256. Id. at ¶ 30.
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In 2014, the Israeli Supreme Court decided the CMR case, criticizing the
public interest justification of the UPL rules. In the landmark decision, the
Supreme Court held that the UPL rules:
[L]ike any monopolistic arrangement, are designed to promote
the public interest, but simultaneously offer an advantage to the
holder of the monopoly in safeguarding the boundaries of the
profession and preventing the entry of competitors into the
market. We must therefore be aware of the risk of exploitation
of this power by the group benefiting from it and examine
whether the arrangement actually promotes the public interest,
or whether the “public interest” is a cloak for the monopoly
holder, which allows it to continue to control the boundaries of
the profession to promote its self-interest.257
The Supreme Court was critical of the IBA for blocking competition at the
expense of nonlawyers, increased access to legal services, and the public
interest.258 It added that a narrow interpretation should be applied to UPL rules
and that such rules should only be upheld in cases where the restriction is
necessary to protect the public interest.259 The Court set out three cumulative
tests for identifying a “legal service,” which only lawyers could provide based
on the UPL rules.260 Applying these tests, the Court allowed CMR to continue
to operate some of the services it provided in the past, finding they were not
“legal services,”261 while disallowing other services, which were “legal
services.”262 The ruling allowed both parties—the commercial company and

257. Id. at ¶ 39 (author translated quotation).
258. See Michal Ofer Tsfoni & Limor Zer-Gutman, Access to Justice in Israel: Rights, Legal Aid
and Pro Bono in a Lawyer Dominant Environment, in THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (H. Whalen-Bridge ed., Cambridge University Press
forthcoming 2021).
259. The Centre for Realization of Medical Rights v. The Israel Bar Association at ¶¶ 42–43; see
also Ziv, supra note 67, at 181–83.
260. The Centre for Realization of Medical Rights v. The Israel Bar Association at ¶ 48.
261. Ziv, supra note 67, at 183.
262. For example, advising National Social Security applicants about the applicable laws
constituted “rendering legal advice” because it involved interpretation of the relevant laws and required
the exercise of professional judgment. The Centre for Realization of Medical Rights v. The Israel Bar
Association at ¶ 50.
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the IBA—to claim victory.263 Still, the CMR case set a precedent for the narrow
construction of UPL rules.264
In spite of the critical tone the Court took in the CMR case, the UPL
restrictions imposed by the IBA on the work of NGOs and law school legal
clinics remained in place until 2017 when the incoming president of the national
ethics committee decided to allow nonprofit organizations and clinics to operate
with only few restrictions.265 One of the authors of this Article previously
argued that the IBA’s campaign against nonprofits revealed the dual purposes
of UPL rules: protecting the public from subpar legal services, while at the same
time safeguarding the self-interest of lawyers in preserving their monopoly in
the marketplace.266
In particular, the IBA’s self-interested stance against nonprofits was
inconsistent with its professed commitment to the public interest for three
related reasons. First, it undercut access to justice since the NGOs and legal
clinics offered legal services to indigent populations that could not otherwise
afford a lawyer.267 Second, the campaign undermined individual autonomy and
free choice, denying would-be clients their choice of nonlawyers.268 Third, it
interfered with the freedom of occupation, deterring lawyers from working in
and for NGOs and legal clinics for fear of facing disciplinary charges.269
In its fight against nonlawyers, the IBA has also targeted AI, including
algorithm-based applications and online services that deploy AI
technologies.270 Israel is known as a “start-up nation” and is home to some of
the leading technology companies in the world,271 including multiple businesses
in the field of “legal-tech”—technology in the service of lawyers and legal
services, such as technologically generated contracts and other legal
263. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 157.
264. For example, in Hasavim, the district court rejected the IBA’s UPL enforcement action,
allowing a commercial company to continue its operation. See CivC (DC Jer) 50926-10-15 Israel Bar
Association v. Hasavim Ltd., Nevo Legal Data Base ¶ 35 (2017) (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
265. Israel Bar Association, Clarification of Decision—Provision of Non-Profit Legal Services,
64 PROF. ETHICS 2, 9 (2017).
266. Zer-Gutman, supra note 246, at 86, 91.
267. Id. at 85–87.
268. Id. at 87–88.
269. Id. at 88.
270. Similar services are offered in the United States by companies such as LegalZoom. See
LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/contact-us [https://perma.cc/B296-G4AD].
271. For example, LawGeex is an Israeli based hi-tech company that developed algorithm to
read and review contracts. See LAWGEEX, https://www.lawgeex.com/ [https://perma.cc/L3PCVBW2].
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documents, contract scanning, error detection, document inspection, and
more.272 However, when such AI allows clients to use algorithms to draft
contracts and bypass the hiring of lawyers, the IBA sees AI as trespassing upon
lawyers’ jurisdiction and invokes the UPL rules.273
In recent years, the IBA has filed several UPL enforcement actions against
companies providing legal technologies to the general public.274 In these
lawsuits, the IBA has sought permanent injunctions preventing the sale and
distribution of the technologies.275 Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
the CMR case, lower courts apply a narrow interpretation of the UPL rules.276
The precedent often leads trial courts to reject the IBA position that the AI
companies have breached the UPL rules, noting the importance of increasing
access to justice.277
For example, in a case decided in 2017, the district court rejected the IBA’s
position of seeking an injunction against a company that was offering an
algorithm-generated service that prepared employment contracts and other
employment related documents on its paid subscription website.278 Citing the
CMR case and its narrow interpretation of the UPL rules, the court concluded
that the company and its algorithm were not rendering legal advice and
services.279 The court further noted that the IBA itself was selling to its lawyermembers similar services of online-produced, AI-generated contracts and other
legal documents, implying that the IBA was arguing a violation of the UPL
rules as a business competitor, not as defender of the public interest.280 The
IBA appealed to the Supreme Court, where during oral argument the Justices

272. The IBA itself, through its commercial arm, offers lawyers online services, including
products designed to assist in the generation of legal documents. See ISRAEL BAR ASSOCIATION LTD.,
https://ibar.org.il/hikashop-menu-for-module-368/category/%d7%90%d7%a1%d7%a7%d7%99
[https://perma.cc/YF2Z-X2HD].
273. Neta Ziv, Who Moved My Mouse? Technology, Online Legal Services and Professional
Ethics, 39 TAU L. REV. 189 (2016) (author translated).
274. Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra note 87, at 604.
275. Ziv, supra note 273, at 218.
276. Id. at 205.
277. CivC (DC Jer) 50926-1-15 Israel Bar Association v. Hasavim Ltd., Nevo Legal Data Base
¶ 25 (2017) (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); CivC (DC TA) 28548-03-17 Israel Bar Association v.
Avramov, Nevo Legal Database (2018) (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). The IBA appealed the first
case to the Supreme Court but withdrew the appeal.
278. See Israel Bar Association v. Hasavim Ltd. at ¶ 35.
279. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26 (finding that each user was individually producing the contract or the
document).
280. Id. at ¶ 27.

ZER-GUTMAN & WALD_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

384

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:341

advised the IBA to withdraw its appeal, hinting that they were about to dismiss
the appeal and rule in favor of the technology company.281 The IBA followed
that advice.282
B. Asserting Independence While Advancing the Profession’s Self-Interest
Israel is a liberal democracy.283 Lawyers thrive in liberal societies, and, in
turn, as they mature, legal professions constitute a building block of the Rule
of Law in such democracies.284 The independence of the legal profession is
inherent to its ability to support and guard the Rule of Law. However, as the
case of Israel shows, too much independence of a mature, secure legal
profession, free of outside supervision and accountability, opens the door for
the profession to over-claim independence to advance its own self-interest. In
Israel, the unfettered independence of the legal profession, manifested in the
exclusive control exercised by the IBA over the practice of law, has at times
undercut the public interest. The IBA’s self-interested over-assertions of
independence have resulted in three specific harms to the public interest.
First, the IBA’s independence over-claims have diminished access to legal
services. The increased number of lawyers in Israel intensified competition,
driving down legal fees—especially those charged by small and medium-sized
firms serving small households.285 Yet, despite the decline in fees, the legal
needs of the poor remain unmet, and access to justice has not improved
greatly.286
It is only in the past two decades that Israeli law has begun to recognize the
importance of the right of access to justice.287 The access agenda has been
advanced by two institutions: the courts, and the NGOs and public interest

281. Ala Levi-Weinrib, How the IBA was Defeated by the Legal Algorithms, GLOBES (Isr. daily
newspaper) (July 28, 2018) (author translated).
282. Id.
283. Navot, supra note 65, at 222.
284. TERRANCE C. HALLIDAY & LUCIEN KARPIK, LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 15, 21 (1997).
285. Zer-Gutman, supra note 70, at 256.
286. Ziv, supra note 67, at 178 (collecting data from the Israel Court Administration showing
that in 2007, 78% of civil-defendants were not represented by a lawyer). In debt collection
proceedings, 95% of debtors were not represented compared to 6% of creditors that did not have a
lawyer. Id.
287. See A. Barak, The Right to Access the Legal System, in SHLOMO LEVIN BOOK: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JUSTICE SHLOMO LEVIN 31, 36, 38–41, 43–50 (Asher Grunis, Eliezer Rivlin & Michael
Karayanni eds., 2013) (author translated).
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lawyers who identified the barriers to accessing the legal system.288 The state
is the central provider of access to legal services and justice in Israel to those
who cannot afford to pay for it,289 but the legal profession and its representative,
the IBA, are extraordinarily influential regarding the degree to which the right
to access justice is realized.290
Regrettably, the IBA’s attempts to limit the number of new lawyers by
lowering the pass rate on the bar exam, extending the length of the mandatory
internship, and enforcing UPL actions against nonlawyers are not the only
examples of the legal profession’s self-interested conduct—which is
inconsistent with its stated commitment to increase access to legal services.
Among other efforts, the IBA’s ongoing battle against the Public Defender’s
Office (PDO)291 is particularly noteworthy. The IBA objected to the creation
of the PDO from the outset, or at least was ambivalent about its formation.292
Since, the IBA has opposed any expansion of the PDO’s powers. In 2016, the
President of the IBA wrote to the Minister of Justice, claiming that the PDO
provided overly broad representation to defendants, suspects, and prisoners,
“which violates the freedom of occupation of lawyers engaged in the criminal
field.”293 In February 2017, the President of the IBA announced that at his
request, the Minister of Justice was considering several legislative amendments
that would reduce the scope of representation offered by the PDO.294 Those
amendments were never enacted. The PDO annual reports of 2018 and 2019
show that no changes were made regarding its designated activities.295 Still,
288. NETA ZIV, WHO WILL GUARD THE GUARDIANS OF LAW? LAWYERS IN ISRAEL BETWEEN
(author translated).
289. In Israel, the state provides legal aid in criminal and in civil cases, mainly by providing
legal services by state-employed government lawyers or state-funded lawyers. Since the 1970s, there
has been a limited state legal aid agency in civil cases. In criminal cases, the Public Defender’s Office
was established in 1996 and has grown considerably since then. See Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra
note 87, at 608–09.
290. Michal Ofer Tsfoni & Limor Zer-Gutman, supra note 258.
291. See Kenneth Mann & David Weiner, Creating a Public Defender System in the Shadow of
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 91 (2008).
292. Eli Salzberger, The Israeli Lawyers’ Connection: On the Israel Bar Association and its
Allies, 32 MISHPATIM L. REV. 43, 68 n.115 (2002) (Isr.) (author translated).
293. See Letter from Effi Naveh, President of the Isr. Bar Assoc., to Ayelet Shaked, Minister of
Just. (June 20, 2016) (on file with and translated by the authors) (emphasis added).
294. Public Announcement by the President of the Isr. Bar Assoc. reducing the scope of
representation by the Public Defender’s Office (Feb. 27, 2017) (on file with the authors).
295. PDO ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 131 (2018) (Isr.); PDO ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 127
(2019)
(Isr.).
The
annual
activity
reports
can
be
found
at
THE STATE, MARKET AND CIVIL SOC’Y 91–115 (2015)
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purporting to advance the economic interests of criminal defense attorneys, the
IBA was willing to publicly risk reducing access to justice in criminal cases
where representation is most needed.
Second, the IBA has used its statutory role as the exclusive representative
of the legal profession to advance the interests of lawyers, even at the expense
of politicizing the judiciary and undermining its independence. According to
Israeli law, the IBA has a statutory guaranteed position on the Judicial
Appointments Committee.296 The process for appointing judges in Israel is
fairly unique.297 The Judicial Appointments Committee consists of nine
members: the President of the Supreme Court, two Justices of the Supreme
Court elected by the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and
another minister elected by the government, two Knesset members elected by
the Knesset and two representatives of the IBA elected by the National Council
of the IBA.298 The Judicial Appointments Committee is chaired by the Minister
of Justice.299 Statutory rules provide for the working procedures of the
Committee;300 a decision on the appointment of a judge is passed by a simple
majority on the Committee, while a decision on the appointment of a Justice of
the Supreme Court must be passed by a majority of seven of the nine members
of the Committee.301
The judicial appointment consensus used to be that “thanks to its unique
composition, the Committee makes decisions that are generally free of political
considerations and appoints judges who are both of high professional standing
and free from professional bias.”302 Furthermore, “It is the candidates’
professional competence and not their political agenda that is evaluated.”303 In
https://www.gov.il/he/departments/publications/reports/annual-report-all
[https://perma.cc/X8U8P5NP]. The 2018 report indicates a slight decline in the number of PDO cases, unrelated to changes
in the authority and powers of the PDO.
296. § 6, Judges Law, 5733-1953 (1953) (Isr.).
297. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE FOR JUDGES’ SELECTION ARRANGEMENTS 24–25 (2001)
(author translated).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. § 11(a), Rules of Judiciary (Judicial Appointment Committee Work Procedures), 5744–
1984, KT 4689 (Isr.).
301. § 7, Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, SH 1123 (1984) (Isr.). Over the past
few years, a fierce struggle has been waged in the Knesset over the composition of the Judicial
Appointments Committee, which has led to several amendments to the rules regulating work
procedures.
302. NAVOT, supra note 65, at 89.
303. Id.
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2017, however, the process collapsed when the President of the IBA revealed
that he was working with the Minister of Justice to appoint only conservative,
right-wing candidates.304 In this way, the conservative Minister of Justice, with
the support of the two IBA representatives on the Judicial Appointments
Committee, succeeded in bringing about the appointment of more than 100 new
judges, including six new Supreme Court Justices (out of 15).305
In return, the Minister of Justice supported all the legislative amendments
initiated by the IBA, including its bar exam agenda.306 Within a record time
frame, all the promises made by the President of the IBA during his election
campaign were approved by the government. The period of internship was
extended from twelve to eighteen months, the examination format was changed,
and the pass rate dropped dramatically.307 It should be noted that for fifteen
years, the IBA failed to convince various Ministers of Justice and Parliaments
to support its position and amend the law so the internship period will be
extended from one year to eighteen months.308
The IBA’s statutory power, having two seats on the Judicial Appointments
Committee alongside the other three branches of government, was given to the
IBA because of its expertise and knowledge regarding judicial selections,309 as
well as its role as the representative of the legal profession. When IBA
representatives on the Judicial Appointments Committee vote not based on that
expertise and knowledge but rather based on the profession’s self-interest, they
undermine the public interest. The point, to be clear, is not to complain about
the appointment of conservative leaning judges to the bench, nor is it to suggest
that IBA representatives ought to automatically align themselves with the three
Justices on the Committee in opposition to the representatives of the legislature
and the executive branches. Rather, the point is that the representatives of the
legal profession must act to advance the public interest, exercising their
professional judgment based on their expertise and knowledge. When the IBA
304. Dr. Guy Loria, The Committee for Appointing Conservative, GLOBES (Isr. daily newspaper)
(Mar.
20,
2019),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001278773
[https://perma.cc/6VKS-X93Z] (author translated).
305. Id. (explaining the danger in such appointments).
306. Id.
307. Zer-Gutman, supra note 74, at 141.
308. Katvan, Zer-Gutman & Ziv, supra note 87, at 603–04 (explaining that in 2002, a public
committee recommended to extend the internship period to eighteen months. “The IBA lobbied
strongly with the Ministry of Justice and Parliament to implement the proposed changes but succeeded
only in 2017.”).
309. Simhon Shtreet, The Process of Nomination Judges: Procedure and Standards, 8
HAMISPAT L. REV. 357, 362 (2003) (Isr.).
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representatives act in a manner that suggests a quid pro quo bargain meant to
advance the interests of the profession, the burden ought to shift to the
profession to show that it was acting in the best interests of the public.
Finally, the IBA is using its position to advance legislation favoring the
self-interest of the legal profession. IBA volunteers appear on a regular basis
in legislative deliberations in Parliament, representing the position of the legal
profession when new bills are deliberated.310
Notably, the IBA asserts
positions on bills broadly, not limiting itself to bills that directly pertain to
lawyers or the practice of law. For example, the IBA’s summary of its
legislative activities in 2018 reveals that IBA representatives participated in
deliberations regarding amendments to the penal code and in deliberations
regarding amendments concerning electric bicycles and employers’ paid leave
for women having fertility treatments.311
Because of the IBA’s position and role as the exclusive representative of
the legal profession, IBA representatives who take part in the legislative
deliberations are not considered lobbyists, and the lobbying rules and
regulations do not apply on them.312 Yet, arguably, the IBA is an interest group
promoting the interests of the legal profession and its various factions.313 For
example, the IBA forum dealing with the enforcement of judgments is
dominated by lawyers who represent creditors, such that the positions presented
by this forum to the legislature overwhelmingly reflect the interests of creditors
and not those of debtors.314
310. See, e.g., Announcement from the IBA President, Unprecedented Achievement for the IBA
in the Legislative Process (Nov. 11, 2021).
311. Examples are drawn from THE 20TH KNESSET, WINTER SESSION SUMMARY: ACTIVITIES
OF
THE
KNESSET
BAR
ASSOCIATION
(2018)
(Isr.),
http://www.israelbar.org.il/magazine/knesset_winter_session_2018/68/
[https://perma.cc/LKK9EJ57]; Jonatan Green, Regulating Lawyers in Israel—Analysis and Call for Reform 7 n.28 (Kohelet
Policy
Forum,
Policy
Paper
No.
60,
2020),
https://kohelet.org.il/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/KPF_00108_Attorneys-Analysis-Reform_60_Electronic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9NH-PGGT] (author translated).
312. § 65, Knesset Law (1994) (Isr.).
313. See Gur Megido, IBA Representatives in the Knesset are Lobbyists, GLOBES (Isr. daily
newspaper)
(Jan.
28,
2016),
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001098915
[https://perma.cc/J5VQ-2X4D] (author translated).
314. For example, the position paper sent by the forum to the chairperson of the Constitution,
Law and Justice Committee in the Knesset with regard to proposed amendments in the Executive
Office Regulations, sought an interpretation pursuant to which costs could be imposed on a party for
adjourning a hearing even where the party was unrepresented. See Yosef Weitzman & Lior Shapira,
Draft Execution Orders Regulations (Amendment), 5766—2016, Regulation of authority for imposing
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Similarly, the IBA’s involvement in a special hearing regarding legal fees
charged by lawyers representing plaintiffs in army disability cases revealed its
complicated role advancing the interests of its members.315 In that hearing, an
IBA representative, a private lawyer who mainly represents plaintiffs in
disability cases, vigorously opposed proposals to cap the legal fees collected by
lawyers in army disability cases.316 The representative claimed that such a cap
will harm plaintiffs who will not be able to retain elite (and presumably
expensive) lawyers while the other side, the government, will be represented
by excellent, experienced lawyers.317 Claiming that capping legal fees will
harm plaintiffs is somewhat dubious given the prevalence of fee caps in other
areas of law, such as car accident law,318 without evidence of plaintiffs having
difficulties retaining lawyers.319 Arguably, and contrary to the IBA
representative’s claim, fee caps are meant to benefit plaintiffs by guaranteeing
that most of the recovery will end up in their hands, as opposed to lawyers’.320
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal profession scholarship is blooming,321 with new contributions from
all over the world.322 Vastly different laws, background conditions, cultures,
and contexts, however, limit the extent to which one legal profession can learn

expenses
(Israel
Bar
Association,
Working
Paper
No.
4105/16,
2016),
http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?catID=8&pgID=227105 [https://perma.cc/3Y66-JRDT].
315. 20TH KNESSET, supra note 311, at 16–18.
316. Id. at 15–18.
317. Id. at 18.
318. Compensation for Car Accident Injuries Act (1975) (Isr.).
319. David Zalmanovitsh, The Legal Sector in the World and in Israel, GLAWBAL (Isr.) (2017)
(author translated) http://www.glawbal.com/upload/GLawBAL%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5QJH8GL].
320. ELIEZER RIVLIN, CAR ACCIDENT 1045 (2011).
321. See David Luban & W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate
History, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 337 (2017) (summarizing the evolution and growth of theoretical
legal ethics scholarship); LAWYERS IN 21ST-CENTURY SOCIETIES, , supra note 40, at 610.
322. See, e.g., THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE
OF THE CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY (Luciana Gross
Cunha, Daniela Monteiro Gabbay, José Garcez Ghirardi, David M. Trubek & David B. Wilkins eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2018); THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION:
THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY (David B.
Wilkins, Vikramaditya S. Khanna & David M. Trubek eds., Cambridge University Press 2017);
SWETHAA S. BALLAKRISHNEN, ACCIDENTAL FEMINISM—GENDER PARITY AND SELECTIVE
MOBILITY AMONG INDIA’S PROFESSIONAL ELITE (Princeton University Press 2020).
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from the experiences of another.323 Mature legal professions, for example, may
have relatively little to learn from the important experiences of emerging legal
professions and perhaps have not as much to teach as they may assume.324
Indeed, even among developed professions, significant historical, political,
economic, and cultural differences limit the practical relevance of comparative
studies across the common law and civil law divide.325 The American legal
profession may naturally pay close attention to other mature professions in
English-speaking common law countries, such as the United Kingdom, but it
can also learn from the experiences of the Israeli legal profession—a mature
profession following the common law tradition. Specifically, the recent
experiences of the Israeli legal profession should be of particular interest to
American lawyers, regulators, and scholars as it is dealing with challenges
similar to the ones facing the legal profession in the United States.
The Article’s analysis of the independence of the Israeli legal profession,
and how that profession invokes and uses its exclusive control over the practice
of law in Israel to deal with regulatory challenges yields two key insights. First,
strongly independent, powerful, mature legal professions appear to use their
position to advance the self-interest of lawyers even at the expense of the public
interest, to limit competition in the market for legal service, and to defeat
regulatory reforms meant to increase access, transparency, and accountability
of the profession.
The Israeli legal profession, acting through the IBA, did not hesitate to erect
new barriers to entry into the profession—such as a lower pass rate on the bar
exam and a longer mandatory internship period—to attempt to reduce the
number of new law students and lawyers in response to an overall increase in

323. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 515–19 (1990)
(“The importance of taking context into account is clear when we reexamine how lawyers actually
interpret and apply legal rules.”). See also David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993).
324. See, e.g., William P. Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and Found: Searching for Legal
Professionalism in the People’s Republic of China 287–310, in RAISING THE BAR-THE EMERGING
LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA (William P. Alford ed., Harvard University Press 2007); William
P. Alford, On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986);
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and Prospects of U.S.Sponsored “Rule of Law” Reform Projects in the People’s Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 64 (2000).
325. For examples of studies of civil law legal professions, see generally, VAUCHEZ & FRANCE,
THE NEOLIBERAL REPUBLIC, supra note 39; LUCIEN KARPIK, FRENCH LAWYERS: A STUDY IN
COLLECTIVE ACTION, 1274-1994 (Oxford University Press 2000).
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the number of lawyers in Israel since the 1990s.326 The IBA also sought to
forcefully enforce the legal profession’s monopoly over the provision of legal
services through UPL rules to limit the ability of nonlawyers, including
evolving AI technology, to compete with Israeli lawyers.327 Similarly, the IBA
resisted regulatory reforms, such as Amendment No. 38328 and the 2008
reform,329 when the proposals appeared inconsistent with the interests of the
legal profession.
Second, strongly independent legal professions pursue the self-interest of
their members while claiming to act in the best interests of the public. That is,
not only do mature legal professions over-claim independence, seeking to
distract critics from substantive reform agendas by asserting threats to their
independence—hardly a persuasive claim when made by powerful, wellestablished profession—but they disguise their self-interest by publicly
claiming to advance and advocate for the public interest.
When the Israeli legal profession, for example, sought to limit the number
of new entrants into the profession by making the bar exam significantly more
difficult and extended the length of the mandatory internship, it claimed that
the measure was necessary to protect the public from incompetent and lowquality lawyers. New private law schools were arguably graduating classes of
law students who were not admitted by the historically higher-ranked university
law schools, flooding the market with presumably low-quality lawyers.
Advocating for a lower pass rate on the bar exam, the IBA, therefore,
purportedly was not acting in lawyers’ self-interest to limit the number of new
lawyers and reduce competition in the market but in the public interest, ensuring
the competence of new lawyers.330
Similarly, when the IBA was seeking to enforce UPL rules to stop
nonlawyers, including AI, from competing with lawyers, it purported to explain
its reasoning not in terms of the self-interest of lawyers but rather as protecting
the public interest. Nonlawyers who did not meet the rigorous standards for
admission into the profession were presumed less or unqualified to serve the
public effectively.331

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Supra Section III.A.i.
Supra Section III.A.iii.
Supra Section III.A.i.
Supra Section III.A.ii.
Supra Section III.A.i.
Supra Section III.A.iii.
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The tendency of mature legal professions, like the Israeli and American
legal professions, to use their independence and near exclusive control over the
practice of law to advance their self-interest while purporting to advocate for
the public interest does not mean that we ought to dismiss or belittle what
lawyers have to say when facing significant challenges affecting the profession
and the public. It does mean, however, that we ought to take the profession’s
independence claims with a grain of salt and contextually and critically assess
the substantive positions taken by the profession. Moreover, the documented
track record of the profession to over-claim independence to defeat reform
agendas in its own self-interest suggests that rather than presume that any
reform agenda that seems to undermine the independence of the profession
ought to be rejected, we ought to shift the burden to the profession, given its
monopoly position, to justify and explain why the reform agenda ought not
move forward.
The American legal profession is facing four related challenges in the
twenty-first century. The nationalization of law practice, driven by client
needs, is inevitable, yet history, tradition, and the independence of the legal
profession stand in the way of grand changes to the state-based prevailing
regime. State supreme courts are simply unlikely to cede control over the
regulation of lawyers, and even if they did, there is no ready “national” court
that could take over. Instead, the nationalization of law practice is likely to
continue to evolve gradually and organically, with state supreme courts
increasingly loosening traditional state-based controls, including UPL rules.
Over time, this may come to mean that American lawyers, admitted in any U.S.
jurisdiction, will be able to practice in all U.S. jurisdictions.
There is, to be sure, a long way to go before such nationalization becomes
a reality and many practical hurdles to clear. For example, to prevent a race to
the bottom—that is, a flocking of law school graduates to take the bar exam in
the jurisdiction with the least difficult bar exam—applicable rules will need to
be promulgated, perhaps requiring graduates to sit for the bar exam in the
jurisdiction in which they expect to practice. In the alternative, states may
coordinate and move toward a national bar exam, akin to the Uniform Bar
Exam, a phenomenon already underway.332 Following admission, states will
need to further coordinate regarding the application and enforcement of the
rules of professional conduct, perhaps relaying more heavily on the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct as the presumptive national rules.
332. See Jurisdictions Administering the UBE, supra note 47; see generally Dzienkowski &
Peronia, supra note 52.
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Notably, all these likely developments, some of which are already in motion,
suggest greater reliance on organizations like the ABA, akin to the IBA, and
trigger the “too much independence” concern.
As the American legal profession grows more national, issues like
admission to law school and the regulation of law schools; nationalizing the bar
exam; rethinking, modernizing, and nationalizing the rules of professional
conduct;333 and nationalizing standards for disciplinary enforcement, including
transparency and lay, nonlawyer involvement in them, will be increasingly
decided by lawyers. The tendency, understandably enough, given the ABA’s
vast experience and expertise, will be to rely on it to lead the way, and the ABA,
no doubt, will be delighted to step into the national spotlight. And this is exactly
where we ought to be mindful of the profession’s tendencies, acting through its
organized institutions, to advance its own self-interest while claiming to
advocate for the public interest. In every critical junction—from admission
criteria to the bar exam, rules of professional conduct and discipline, including
greater transparency and accountability in all of these stage–the burden should
be on the profession to prove that its proposed arrangements and their details
advance the public interest. Hiding behind independence over-claims to sustain
and legitimate the status quo should simply not be done.
Providing greater access to legal services, especially for those who cannot
afford to pay for it, is a constitutive challenge for the profession that it has been
struggling to meet. At this crucial moment of likely deregulation, in terms of
both welcoming nonlawyers into the market for legal services and permitting
greater flexibility for AI providers, the profession is likely to proceed cautiously
and guardingly—as it has, for example, in Washington, Arizona, Utah, and
California.334 The Israeli experience provides both a cautionary tale and a
possible way forward. On the one hand, the American legal profession, acting
through its state-based institutions, is likely to and has followed the lead of its
Israeli counterpart in aggressively trying to enforce existing UPL rules.335 On
the other hand, the Israeli experience suggests that the U.S. legal profession,
fearing a U.S. Supreme Court precedent finding UPL rules unconstitutional,
may be willing to coordinate a narrow (or narrower) interpretation of the
333. Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 227
(2014).
334. See supra text accompanying note 12.
335. Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public?
Rethinking Unauthorized Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587 (2014). See also Laurel
A. Rigertas, The Birth of the Movement to Prohibit the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 37 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 97 (2018).
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“practice of law.” Perhaps such a definition can be offered in a new addition
to rule 1.0, the terminology section of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, or in the Restatement on the Law Governing Lawyers, ceding some
ground and practice areas to nonlawyers.
To an extent, inequality within the profession reflects trends outside of it.
For example, growing stratification and economic inequality, increasingly
separating BigLaw equity partners and elite in-house counsel from solo
practitioners and low-tier lawyer-employees,336 reflects the growing economic
inequality in American society. Still, for a profession that purports to lead in
the fight for greater equality and play a special role with regard to justice,337
the legal profession must do more, avoiding its usual tactics of evasion and
delay meant to sustain the status quo. To begin with, the profession must
increase transparency regarding the practice of law, including admission,
discipline, compensation, stratification, and career trajectories to allow for
informed decision-making by members and prospective members of the bar.338
Next, it must combat inequality and implicit bias to ensure that everybody has
a fair opportunity to compete for its positions of power and influence. Although
adopting EDI CLE rules is certainly a step in the right direction, the legal
profession must proactively combat implicit bias in its midst, setting specific,
quantifiable objectives for its various members and institutions.339
Finally, the legal profession must be a leader in the quest for greater
equality in American society. Passive inaction and pursuit of self-interest,
which inadvertently may increase inequality, cannot longer be tolerated. Once
again, the experience of the Israeli legal profession is telling. Aggressively
enforcing UPL rules seemingly to ensure competence and the quality of legal
services while practically denying access to legal services for those who cannot
afford to pay for them; instilling a more demanding bar exam score in the name
of excluding low quality entrants while bringing about less diverse classes of
new lawyers; and opposing caps on legal fees which can benefit claimants, all

336. Wald, Getting in and out of the House, supra note 23.
337. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, pmbl., cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
338. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Selectively Disciplining Advocates, 54 CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3864142.
[https://perma.cc/BX8M-JEMV]; See generally, Eli Wald, BigLaw Identity Capital: Pink and Blue,
Black and White, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2509, 2544–47 (2015) (advocating for greater transparency by
large law firms); Eli Wald, Success, Merit and Capital in America, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 64–66 (2017)
(arguing that transparency is a constitutive condition for the successful pursuit of the American
Dream).
339. Pearce, Wald & Ballakrishen, supra note 22, at 2443–44.
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increase inequality and undercut the profession’s commitment to justice and
equality.
The American legal profession, in turn, need not reinvent the wheel or limit
itself to sympathetic statements in support of the Black Lives Matter and
@metoo movements. Lawyers need not agree on particular conceptions of
justice and equality in order to stand united in support of them.340 Instead, they
can serve as civic teachers and leaders,341 role models in the quest for greater
equality for all.342

340. Eli Wald, Formation Without Identity: Avoiding a Wrong Turn in the Professionalism
Movement, 89 UMKC L. REV. 685 (2021).
341. Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The Lawyer
as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207 (2009); Eli Wald & Russell
G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
601 (2016).
342. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 28, at 290.

